COMMENT

THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE SOLUTION: ENSURING THE
INTERSTATE RECOGNITION OF
SAME-SEX PARENTAGE

ANNA MARIE D’GINTO†
In the celebrated decision of Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court held
that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry that cannot be infringed
by state law bans on marriage equality. Post-Obergefell, states around the country
are grappling with what the mandate means for parentage and how their family law
regimes should be adjusted in light of the increasing diversity in today’s family
structures. Variation in whether states presume both partners in a same-sex
relationship to be the legal parents of their child and, if not, whether a second-parent
adoption is available to establish the parentage of the nonbiological parent implicates
significant uncertainty for these couples. Entitling the parentage of same-sex couples
as reflected in the birth certificate of the child to interstate recognition on the basis
that the birth certificate is a “record” within the ambit of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause would provide greater protection of their legal status. The birth certificate
solution is both easily implementable and doctrinally supportable in light of various
principles reflected in the Supreme Court’s recent family law jurisprudence. The
interests at stake are significant for both the same-sex couple and their child, and
entitling the parentage listed in the birth certificate to full faith and credit recognition
would provide greater immediate protection to the legal status of these couples.
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INTRODUCTION
Meet Pam and Sue, a married lesbian couple living in Washington, D.C.
Desiring to start a family of their own, Pam conceives and gives birth to a
child. At the hospital on the day of the birth, the hospital nurse records the
names of both Pam and Sue on the child’s birth certiﬁcate as parents. Pam
and Sue intend for Sue to function as the child’s other parent, a second
mother. Assuming that Pam’s egg is used,1 Sue will bear no biological
1 In a traditional surrogacy arrangement, the egg belongs to the female who carries the child
to term. Scientiﬁc advances, principally in vitro fertilization, have enabled an alternative form of
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connection to the child. Therefore, traditionally Sue would be considered a
legal stranger vis-à-vis the child, with no right to custody or any of the
other beneﬁts attendant with valid parental status.2
However, because Pam and Sue are domiciled in Washington, D.C., Sue’s
parentage will be recognized by virtue of her marital relationship with Pam,
the child’s birth mother.3 To conclusively protect Sue’s status, Pam and Sue
could pursue a second-parent adoption. However, there are myriad reasons
why a same-sex couple may choose not to pursue adoption to formalize the
status of the nonbiological parent, including barriers to access, unavailability
of adoption, and the requirement that an adequate amount of time pass to
allow the applicant to display conduct entitling her to parental status.4
In the absence of adoption, if Pam, Sue, and their child travel outside of
D.C., Sue’s parentage will become insecure because there is no formal
recognition of her status under current law.5 Therefore, if the family wishes
to make a short trip to Delaware, Sue’s parental status, which is based on
the operation of D.C.’s marital presumption provision, will be in jeopardy
and even susceptible to rejection.6

surrogacy—gestational surrogacy—in which an embryo is created using the egg and sperm of the
intended parents. The fertilized embryo is then transferred to the gestational surrogate who will
not bear a biological connection and will give birth to the child. This development in the science of
surrogacy has enabled both partners in a same-sex lesbian relationship to validly claim a physical
connection to the child in a situation where one partner “donates” her egg to the other partner,
who serves as the gestational mother just as a gestational surrogate would in carrying the child to
term. This variation is relatively novel and has not been extensively explored in case law; for the
sake of simplicity, the hypothetical is conﬁned to the more common situation where the birth
mother is also the biological mother.
2 Jessica Feinberg, Whither the Functional Parent? Revisiting Equitable Parenthood Doctrines in
Light of Same-Sex Parents’ Increased Access to Obtaining Formal Legal Parent Status, 83 BROOK. L.
REV. 55, 55 (2017) (noting that traditionally, legal parentage in the United States derived from
either biology, marriage, or adoption).
3 See D.C. CODE § 16-909(a-1)(2) (2016) (“There shall be a presumption that a woman is the
mother of a child if she and the child’s mother are . . . married . . . at the time of either conception
or birth . . . and the child is born during the marriage . . . .”).
4 See infra notes 79–83 and accompanying text (discussing the insuﬃciencies of second-parent
adoption as a complete solution to the recognition problem faced by same-sex couples).
5 At present, in the absence of a formalized decree or judgment entitled to protection under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the status of Sue’s parentage is uncertain. See infra Part II.
6 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-204 (2018) (“A man is presumed to be the father of a child
if . . . [h]e and the mother of the child are married to each other and the child is born during the
marriage . . . .”). Delaware’s use of gendered terms in its formulation of the marital presumption
means that, on its terms, the marital presumption does not extend to same-sex couples because it
is biologically impossible for a lesbian woman to father her partner’s child. While same-sex couples
have had success in challenging marital presumptions using gendered terms on the theory that the
failure to extend the presumption to same-sex couples constitutes a denial of equal protection in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, there has been no challenge in Delaware, so at present,
Sue’s legal status is insecure. Even if it is assumed that an equal protection challenge would be
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Ambiguity regarding the validity of parental status also may arise in the
event of dissolution of the same-sex partnership. Suppose that, after ﬁve
years of coparenting in D.C., Pam and Sue terminate their relationship and
Pam moves to Delaware. Now, Sue’s ability to maintain standing as a parent
to sue for custody is in question because the basis for her parental status
(i.e., her marital relationship to the child’s biological mother) has been
terminated. In this circumstance, it is not unprecedented for the legal
parent to use her partner’s lack of a legal connection to argue that the
nonbiological parent should not have any custody rights to the child, an
argument that has been met with varying degrees of success.
Finally, the validity of Sue's parental status as reﬂected in the birth
certiﬁcate may be relevant if Pam passes away because, as a nonlegal parent,
Sue will not automatically be entitled to physical custody or decisionmaking
rights with respect to the child's upbringing. In this scenario, it is especially
crucial for Sue's legal status to be certain because the child is already
grieving the loss of one parent.7
The unsettled nature of Sue’s parental status is a question that looms
large for hypothetical Pam and Sue, along with thousands of couples facing
similar situations across the country. The answer to the uncertainty is
complicated by a patchwork of state family law regimes spawned by the
Supreme Court’s landmark decisions in Obergefell v. Hodges8 and Pavan v.
Smith.9 States diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their positions on whether both partners
in a same-sex relationship are presumed to be the child’s legal parents, and,
if not, whether a second-parent adoption is available to establish the
parentage of the nonbiological parent, thus leading to great ambiguity.
While the Full Faith and Credit Clause provides some protection against
these uncertainties, it does not, at present, adequately solve the problem in
every situation. The law is not clear on the extent to which a parentage
arrangement that is neither formalized in a litigated custody order nor an
adoption decree is entitled to interstate recognition. As a result, same-sex

upheld in the Delaware courts, litigation is time-consuming and would not help Sue if she needs
recognition of her parental status immediately.
7 See, e.g., Suzanne Bryant, Second Parent Adoption: A Model Brief, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 233, 240 (1995) (describing a situation in which a nonbiological lesbian partner was
ultimately deemed a parent of her deceased partner’s child, though this outcome was reached only
after months of litigation, during which time the child was forced to bounce between the homes of
her grandparents and her aunt).
8 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); see also Leslie Joan Harris, Obergefell’s Ambiguous Impact on Legal
Parentage, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 81 (2017) (discussing the diﬃculties that same-sex couples
continue to face post-Obergefell).
9 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017).
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couples face a legal environment in which there is “volatile uncertainty
regarding the portability of parental rights . . . from state to state.”10
This Comment proposes entitling the parentage of same-sex parents as
reflected in the birth certificate of the child to full faith and credit recognition
on the basis that a birth certificate is a “record” within the ambit of the clause.
The practicality of this solution is tied to the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Pavan v. Smith, which held that the state-granted right of the marital
partner of a woman who conceives a child through artificial insemination to
be listed as a parent on the child’s birth certificate must be extended equally
to same-sex couples.11 Because the vast majority of states have analogous
statutes12 or judicial decisions13 requiring the marital partner of a woman who
conceives through artificial insemination to be treated as the child’s other
parent (despite the undisputed lack of a biological connection), and because
Pavan mandates that this guarantee be extended to same-sex couples, entitling
birth certificates to full faith and credit recognition would provide greater

1 KAREN MOULDING, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW § 1.24 (West 2010).
137 S. Ct. at 2079.
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a)(1) (West 2017) (“If a woman conceives through
assisted reproduction . . . with the consent of another intended parent, that intended parent is
treated in law as if he or she were the natural parent . . . .”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5405(3)
(2018) (“The . . . rights . . . [of] the mother’s husband shall be the same for all legal intents and
purposes as if the child had been naturally and legitimately conceived by the mother and the
mother’s husband, if the husband consented to the performance of artiﬁcial insemination.”);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46, § 4B (2017) (“Any child born to a married woman as a result of artiﬁcial
insemination with the consent of her husband, shall be the legitimate child of the mother and such
husband.”); New Mexico Uniform Parentage Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-11A-703 (2019) (“A
person who . . . consents to assisted reproduction as provided in Section 7-704 . . . with the intent
to be the parent of a child is a parent of the resulting child.”); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73(1)
(McKinney 2008) (“Any child born to a married woman by means of artiﬁcial insemination . . .
and with the consent in writing of the woman and her husband, shall be deemed the legitimate
child of the husband and his wife for all purposes.”); see also Nancy D. Polikoﬀ, A Mother Should
Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First
Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 234-35 (2009) (summarizing the special artiﬁcial insemination
rule, whereby the husband of a married woman who conceives using donor sperm is presumed to
be the father so long as he consented to the insemination procedure, and noting that more than
half of the states have a statute to this eﬀect).
13 See, e.g., Carson v. Heigel, No. 3:16-0045, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21104, at *6 (D.S.C. Feb.
15, 2017) (opining that a nonbiological parent’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were infringed upon
by the state’s refusal to list her as a second parent on the child’s birth certiﬁcate); Torres v.
Seemeyer, 207 F. Supp. 3d 905, 913 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (holding that Wisconsin’s artiﬁcial
insemination statute must be “appl[ied] . . . to female couples and diﬀerent-sex couples equally”);
Waters v. Ricketts, 159 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1001 (D. Neb. 2016) (concluding that under Obergefell, state
oﬃcials must “treat same-sex couples the same as diﬀerent-sex couples” in the context of birth
certiﬁcate issuance); Gardenour v. Bondelie, 60 N.E.3d 1109, 1119 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (applying
the judicially developed artiﬁcial insemination consent rule to protect the parentage of a
nonbiological same-sex parent).
10
11
12
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protection to same-sex parentage. As long as parental status is reflected in the
birth certificate, the couple can expect interstate recognition of their status.
By exploring the intersection of the “records” prong of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause and the jurisprudence of birth certiﬁcates, this Comment
seeks to elucidate one way in which the parentage of same-sex couples can
be equalized to that of opposite-sex couples. Part I overviews the current
landscape of family law across the United States, discussing four of the
major areas in which state policies diverge and describing the inadequacies
of existing solutions to protect parentage. Part II analyzes birth certiﬁcates
under the doctrinal full faith and credit framework, resolving that birth
certiﬁcates most naturally ﬁt within the “records” category but concluding
that the proper treatment of records is unclear due to jurisprudential
ambiguity. Part III discusses why birth certiﬁcates should be entitled to a
higher level of deference under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and
explains how judicially developed limitations do not undermine the
feasibility of this solution. A brief conclusion follows.
I. REVIEW OF CURRENT LANDSCAPE
Before considering the practicality of the birth certiﬁcate solution, it is
necessary to understand the diﬀerences in parentage law across the United
States and how the uneven legal landscape aﬀects same-sex couples.
A. Overview of Diﬀerences in State Policy Leading
to the Full Faith and Credit Problem
Given the vast diversity in the codiﬁcation of family law, clashes
between various states’ policy choices inevitably arise. Because “[t]he
regulation of domestic relations is traditionally the domain of state law,”14
family law legislation is an area where states can fully express the policy
preferences of their citizenry. Indeed, this is an area where states make
diﬀerent, and sometimes diverging, policy choices. The potential for
variation between states on various aspects of family law presents a
potentially enormous problem for same-sex parents. This concern manifests
in the possibility that a nonbiological, nonadoptive functional parent’s
parental status, recognized in their state of domicile, may be denied in
another jurisdiction whose laws do not accord the individual parent status.
With recent recognition of the uncertainty encountered by same-sex
individuals seeking to establish their parentage under laws that were

14

Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U.S. 483, 490 (2013).
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formulated primarily with heterosexual couples in mind,15 many states are
grappling with this thorny problem and attempting to provide either
legislative16 or judicial clarity.17 Other states have not caught up with the
problem, or have made a different policy choice.18 This disparity in
treatment of the law of parentage creates critical uncertainty because without
valid parental status, the parent will not have a legal right to “make health
care decisions for the child, including emergency or end of life decisions . . .
[;] control schooling and education; consent to testing, immunizations, or
psychological exams; or have the child excused for religious observances or
released into her custody by law enforcement officers.”19 This Part will first
briefly review the law on the marital presumption, surrogacy, de facto
parenthood, and second-parent adoption, which are four of the key areas
where state policies significantly diverge, and then summarize proposed and
existing solutions, explaining why they are inadequate to solve the immediate
recognition problem faced by same-sex couples.
1. Marital Presumption and Presumptive Parentage Generally
First, the longstanding marital presumption provides that the spouse of
a woman who gives birth to a child during the course of the marriage is
conclusively presumed to be the parent of the resulting child.20 The
traditional formulation provided a presumption of paternity for the
mother’s husband,21 based on a desire to both combat the stigma associated
15 See e.g., Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 345 n.1 (Iowa 2013)
(collecting statutes that deﬁne the marital presumption in gendered terms); see also Ailsa Chang,
Same-Sex Spouses Turn to Adoption to Protect Parental Rights, NPR (Sept. 22, 2017, 4:45 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2017/09/22/551814731/same-sex-spouses-turn-to-adoption-to-protect-parentalrights [https://perma.cc/2HRB-YSWA] (quoting an experienced family law attorney for the
proposition that “[o]ur law is based on heterosexual, patriarchal circumstances”).
16 See, e.g., Assemb. 2684, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg Sess. (Cal. 2018) (stating that the impetus for
an update to the family law was a desire to “[e]nsure that the parentage provisions of the Family
Code treat same-sex parents equally, including the conclusive marital presumption of parentage”).
17 See, e.g., Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 498-99 (N.Y. 2016) (noting that
“[u]nder the current legal framework, which emphasizes biology, it is impossible—without
marriage or adoption—for both former partners of a same-sex couple to have standing, as only one
can be biologically related to the child” and exploring ways to formulate a proper test that “ensures
equality for same-sex parents”).
18 See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, The Geography of Equal Protection, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1579, 1614
(2017) (explaining how “[t]he family law regimes of many states are infused with anti-gay prejudice”).
19 Steve Sanders, Interstate Recognition of Parent-Child Relationships: The Limits of the State
Interests Paradigm and the Role of Due Process, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 233, 268.
20 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (conﬁrming that California’s
irrebuttable marital presumption was constitutional and therefore rejecting the biological father’s
Fourteenth Amendment objections to the statute).
21 See supra note 12 (referencing a collection of marital presumption provisions that use
gender-speciﬁc language).
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with illegitimacy and promote the familial unit. With the success of the
marriage equality movement and shift in public opinion, courts and
legislatures have begun to experiment with extending the presumption to
same-sex couples, resulting in a presumption of parentage for the
nonbiological lesbian partner for a child born during a marriage. This
presumption is extended to the mother’s marital partner, despite the lack of
a biological connection, because she is the intended parent of the child born
during the marriage and will function as the child’s parent.22 Unlike the
traditional presumption, where the protected husband could plausibly be
the genetic father of the child, the presumption as applied to a same-sex
couple reﬂects a policy determination regarding who should get to be a
parent, notwithstanding biological reality.
Three important advances in the law of marital presumption have
facilitated application to same-sex couples in some states. First, a minority
of legislatures are reformulating marital presumption provisions explicitly
with same-sex lesbian couples in mind, using language directly tied to their
circumstances.23 Second, some legislatures are formulating their marital
presumptions using gender-neutral language, supporting application in the
same-sex context.24 Third, courts increasingly interpret traditional marital
presumptions that either use gendered terminology or reference a “natural”

22 The marital presumption is more naturally applied to same-sex female couples than samesex male couples for a few reasons. First, when a lesbian couple conceives a child, generally a sperm
bank will act as an intermediary, requiring the donor to sign a contract extinguishing his rights.
With the donor’s parental rights eliminated by virtue of the contract he signed, the marital
presumption can easily be applied to establish the legal parentage of both lesbian partners because
there is no potential third parent in the picture. Second, the traditional marital presumption is sex
specific, in that it applies to the spouse (whether male or female) of the birth mother of the child, so
the presumption would seem to have no applicability to same-sex male couples (who cannot give
birth). In fact, applying the traditional marital presumption to a same-sex male couple would not
only be ineffective; it would hurt them because it would favor the husband of the surrogate, so long
as he consented to his wife’s insemination. In summary, the marital presumption as applied to gay
male couples is unworkable as currently formulated. This is one of the many unique challenges faced
by same-sex male couples in establishing parentage, but this Comment will focus on the marital
presumption as applied to same-sex female couples.
23 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-909(a-1)(2) (2016) (“There shall be a presumption that a woman
is the mother of a child if she and the child’s mother are . . . married . . . at the time of either
conception or birth . . . and the child is born during the marriage . . . .”).
24 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-209(a)(2) (2018) (“A child born or conceived during a
marriage is presumed to be the legitimate child of both spouses . . . .”); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 24(1)
(McKinney 201) (“A child . . . born of parents who prior or subsequent to the birth of such child shall
have entered into a civil or religious marriage . . . is the legitimate child of both birth parents . . . .”);
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.116(1)(a) (2018) (“In the context of a marriage or a domestic partnership,
a person is presumed to be the parent of a child if . . . [t]he person and the mother or father of the
child are married to each other . . . and the child is born during the marriage . . . .”).
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parent to require extension to same-sex couples in order to satisfy
constitutional guarantees of equal protection.25
Additionally, a special form of the marital presumption rule has become
increasingly common and is critical to the parentage of same-sex couples.
This variation of the rule provides that when a woman conceives a child
through assisted reproduction techniques, her marital partner, who will not
bear any genetic connection to the child, is a parent so long as she consented
to the procedure.26 This type of rule can be used by a same-sex couple to
establish parenthood, although courts have refused to apply it where the
statutorily enumerated procedures were not followed. For example, in New
Jersey a lesbian couple conceived two children through alternative (as
opposed to artificial) insemination, and despite the fact that both fathers
initially signed contracts relinquishing their paternity rights, two family
courts in New Jersey granted visitation to the respective fathers on grounds
that the artiﬁcial insemination agreement was not enforceable since the
proper statutory process was not followed.27 This meant that the
25 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Jones, 401 P.3d 492, 498 (Ariz. 2017) (holding that under Obergefell
and Pavan, a state statute providing presumption of parentage for a father, but not a second
mother, violated the Equal Protection Clause because “[t]he marital paternity presumption is a
beneﬁt of marriage, [and] the state cannot deny same-sex spouses the same beneﬁts aﬀorded
opposite-sex couples”), cert. denied sub nom. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 138 S. Ct. 1165 (2018);
Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 352, 354 (Iowa 2013) (mandating extension
of the gender-speciﬁc marital presumption, which presumed the parentage of the husband of the
birth mother, on the grounds that the diﬀerential treatment was not supported by a substantial
interest and therefore failed intermediate scrutiny); In re Parental Responsibilities of A.R.L., 318
P.3d 581, 586 (Colo. 2013) (interpreting a gendered marital presumption provision to apply equally
to same-sex couples based on a separate statutory provision mandating that the terms “father” and
“mother” be used interchangeably); see also Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689
(2017) (noting that “[l]aws granting or denying beneﬁts ‘on the basis of the sex of the qualifying
parent’ . . . diﬀerentiate on the basis of gender, and therefore attract heightened review under the
Constitution’s equal protection guarantee”). At the same time, not all courts are willing to apply a
gendered marital presumption to a same-sex couple. See, e.g., Paczkowski v. Paczkowski, 128
N.Y.S.3d 270, 271 (App. Div. 2015) (concluding that a nongestational same-sex spouse was not
presumed a parent because she lacked a “biological relationship” to the child).
26 See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text; see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N, Draft 2002) (“An individual who consents . . . to assisted reproduction by a
woman with the intent to be a parent of a child conceived by the assisted reproduction is a parent
of the child.”). A minority of jurisdictions presume consent of the husband. See, e.g., MD. CODE
ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(b) (LexisNexis 2019) (“A child conceived by artiﬁcial insemination
of a married woman with the consent of her husband is the legitimate child of both of them for all
purposes. Consent of the husband is presumed.”).
27 Andy Polhamus, N.J. Gay Couple’s Custody Battle with Sperm Donor Could Set Precedent, NJ.COM
(Feb.
9,
2015,
8:00
AM),
http://www.nj.com/gloucestercounty/index.ssf/2015/02/nj_gay_couple_in_custody_battle_with_sperm_donor.html
[https://perma.cc/6T7K-N8KJ]. Not all states take this strict compliance approach. See, e.g., Torres v.
Seemeyer, 207 F.Supp.3d 905, 912 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (holding that where, despite nonconformance with
requirements in the artificial insemination provision, a state provides a presumption of parentage for the
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nonbiological lesbian mothers were not entitled to take advantage of
the artiﬁcial insemination marital presumption rule, because the respective
fathers were adjudicated as parents, leaving no room for a third parent.
Notwithstanding the possibility of rejection of parental status if the
statutory procedures for invocation of the artiﬁcial insemination marital
presumption are not followed, the existence of these provisions is crucial for
ensuring respect for the same-sex family, as exempliﬁed by Pavan.
While promising, the foregoing developments in the extension of the
marital presumption do not wholly solve the full faith and credit problem
for same-sex couples because the laws across the states are not uniform. As
long as the family remains intact, their parentage as recognized under the
forum’s law will not be memorialized in a formal judgment, absent a secondparent adoption. Thus, there is no guarantee that the nonbiological parent’s
status will be recognized by other jurisdictions who have not judicially or
legislatively applied the marital presumption to same-sex couples.
2. Surrogacy
Second, states differ significantly in the policy choices they make
regarding the parentage of various actors in the context of surrogacy. A
surrogacy contract will only provide limited protection to the legal status of
the intended, same-sex parents because of the significant variety in state
policy on surrogacy across the country. Only two jurisdictions, Michigan and
New York, continue to affirmatively penalize compensated surrogacy.28
Instead, in most jurisdictions, surrogacy is a matter of unenforceability.29 A
sampling of state policies in the minority of jurisdictions that have provided
nonbiological parent in the birth certificate, this must be applied equally to same-sex couples who
similarly do not fulfill the statutory requirements).
28 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.859(9) (2017) (punishing participants in a compensated
surrogacy arrangement with a $10,000 ﬁne and imprisonment and providing that anyone who
“induces, arranges, procures, or otherwise assists” in a compensated surrogacy arrangement is
culpable of a felony, punishable by a $50,000 ﬁne and up to ﬁve years in prison); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 123 (McKinney 2018) (penalizing compensated surrogacy with a ﬁne of up to $500 and a
civil penalty of $10,000 for anyone who assists in the arrangement).
29 The two frequently cited model acts that deal with surrogacy arrangements similarly
permit both traditional and gestational surrogacy agreements but highly regulate the practice and
limit the circumstances in which these agreements are enforceable. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
§§ 802–805; MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY (AM. BAR
ASS’N, Proposed Draft 2008). Principles of traditional contract law may also be employed to
invalidate a surrogacy contract. See Margaret D. Townsend, Surrogate Mother Agreements:
Contemporary Legal Aspects of a Biblical Notion, 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 467, 469 (1982) (explaining
how the Restatement’s illegal bargain provision, which invalidates agreements that are “criminal,
tortious or otherwise opposed to public policy,” has been employed to challenge surrogacy
arrangements on the theory that they “involve the crime of adultery, violate adoption laws,
circumvent artiﬁcial insemination statutes, or oﬀend the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment”).
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legislative or judicial clarity on the extent to which surrogacy is
unenforceable include: completely voiding traditional but recognizing
gestational surrogacy agreements (North Dakota30 and Kentucky31);
generally allowing both traditional and gestational surrogacy contracts so
long as there is no provision of compensation (Washington32 and New
Jersey33); having completely separate regulations and procedures depending
on whether traditional or gestational surrogacy is used (Florida34); and
allowing for surrogacy contracts in certain situations but explicating a
specific multistep process that must be followed to obtain judicial
preapproval (Virginia35). The lack of legislative clarity on the status of
surrogacy contracts in the majority of states has required courts to confront
this issue and develop ad hoc procedures looking to various factors, including
the intent of the parties36 and other statutory provisions that help illuminate
the legality of surrogacy contracts,37 to determine who is a legal parent.
To the extent that surrogacy issues arise regarding the validity and
enforceability of the parties’ arrangement, they are a function of both our fiftystate system of law and the frequency with which people move from state to state.
In the event of a clash between the laws of two jurisdictions, the issue of whose
law should be applied is addressed by a discipline called conflict of laws.38
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (2017).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (West 2019).
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.230 (2018).
While there is no explicit codiﬁcation of this policy, dating back to the Baby M decision,
New Jersey courts have consistently refused to enforce gestational surrogacy arrangements where
compensation is provided. See Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (N.J. 1988) (rejecting
traditional surrogacy agreement, in which surrogate agreed to be artiﬁcially inseminated and carry
the child to term in exchange for $10,000, on grounds that “in a civilized society, [there are] some
things that money cannot buy”); Melissa Ruth, Note, What to Expect When Someone Is Expecting for
You: New Jersey Needs to Protect Parties to Gestational Surrogacy Agreements Following In Re T.J.S., 60
VILL. L. REV. 383, 391-92 (2015) (summarizing 2011 New Jersey case where the court refused to
recognize the parental status of the second father, instead validating the gestational surrogate as
the child’s second parent).
34 FLA. STAT. § 63.212 (2018).
35 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156–20-165 (2018).
36 See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (holding that, where the two
means of establishing maternity—gestation and biology—do not coincide in one woman, the one
who intended to procreate the child [here, the biological mother who donated her egg to the
gestational surrogate] is the child’s natural mother).
37 See, e.g., P.M. v. T.B., 907 N.W.2d 522, 534 (Iowa 2018) (looking to various factors, including
the jurisdiction’s exemption of surrogacy contracts from the ban on selling children and the
statutorily codified definition of “biological parent” to determine who is entitled to a presumption
of parentage, as instructive to the conclusion that a gestational contract is enforceable).
38 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1971)
(explaining that the purpose of conflict of laws doctrine is to provide ordering and resolution for
“[e]vents and transactions . . . that may have a significant relationship to more than one state”). A
few states explicitly address the forum whose law should apply in the event of a conflict involving
enforcement of a surrogacy contract. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.752(b) (West 2017)
30
31
32
33
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Generally, conflict of laws doctrine, rather than full faith and credit, predominates
in resolving questions regarding the validity of surrogacy arrangements.
While the role of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is more limited in the
surrogacy context, it may become important if the parties have a court order
or judgment memorializing the terms of their surrogacy agreement.
California is one of the few jurisdictions that provides a process by which
intended parents to a surrogacy agreement can establish their parentage
with a judgment prior to the birth of the child.39 When such a judgment or
order is obtained, there may be an issue of the credit to which it is entitled
if the surrogate moves to another jurisdiction where surrogacy agreements
are prohibited. This fact pattern arose in a recent New York case, where a
family court magistrate validated a California paternity judgment
recognizing the parentage of two gay males pursuant to the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, despite the fact that New York’s public policy explicitly
renders surrogacy contracts unenforceable (and is one of the few
jurisdictions that penalize the practice).40 On similar facts, a Texas court
held that full faith and credit mandated the recognition of a parentage
judgment issued to a gay male couple in California who had a child through
surrogacy.41 In summary, same-sex couples may face uncertainty because
states diﬀer signiﬁcantly in the policy choices they make regarding the
parentage of various actors in the surrogacy context and the enforceability
of surrogacy contracts to the extent that full faith and credit issues arise.

(mandating that forum law “controls over any other law with respect to a child conceived under a
gestational agreement . . . .”); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-157 (providing that forum law controls “in any
action brought in the courts of this Commonwealth to enforce or adjudicate any rights or
responsibilities arising under [the Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act]”). Others look to
the approach of the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws, according to which the forum state
should apply the law of the place “where the key event leading to the plaintiff ’s cause of action
occurred.” Deborah L. Forman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Parents in the Wake of Gay Marriage,
Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 46 B.C. L. REV. 1, 54 (2004). Still others follow the approach
of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which specifies that the forum state should
identify the state with the most significant relationship with the child based on a multifactorial
analysis. Id. For a thorough discussion of surrogacy and conflict of law issues, see Susan Frelich
Appleton, Surrogacy Arrangements and the Conflict of Laws, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 399 (1990).
39 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (West 2018) (explicating the process whereby intended
parents in a gestational surrogacy arrangement can ﬁle an assisted reproduction agreement and
obtain a judgment or order establishing a parent–child relationship).
40 Mark Fass, Despite N.Y. Policy, Magistrate Backs Calif. Surrogacy Contract, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 28,
2010,
12:00
AM),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202474027048/
[https://perma.cc/NW7Z-J84K].
41 Berwick v. Wagner, 509 S.W.3d 411, 419 (Tex. App. 2014).
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3. De Facto Parenthood
Third, some jurisdictions provide for parentage based on functional
conduct, making parental status completely independent of either marriage or
biological participation in the conception of the child. De facto parentage is
an equitable doctrine that grants flexibility to the trial court in evaluating
which actors have exhibited concern, affection, and care for the child, allowing
them to demonstrate the parental role they hold through their actions.42
For example, Delaware’s recently codified de facto parentage statute
provides a de facto parent legal status equivalent to that of the birth mother
or one who adopts the child.43 The power of a de facto parenthood regime to
protect the parentage of a same-sex couple is exemplified by the Delaware
decision that revolutionized this change in the law. In Smith v. Gordon,44 the
Delaware Supreme Court denied standing to a nonlegal parent who sought
custody of her former same-sex partner’s adoptive child.45 The unmarried
same-sex partners had jointly raised the child for over a year, and the
nonlegal parent provided medical benefits. Nonetheless, the Delaware
Supreme Court refused to recognize her functional parental status, reasoning
that because she was not a legal parent as defined by the Delaware Code, she
lacked standing to petition for custody.46 This outcome prompted criticism,47
and the Delaware legislature enacted an amendment to the statutory
definition of “parent” that expressly included the de facto parent.
Retroactively applying the new de facto parent provision, the Delaware
Supreme Court subsequently granted the nonlegal parent in Gordon joint
custody of the child.48 In addition to Delaware, Indiana49 and the District of

160 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 8 (2017).
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (2019) (providing that to be considered a de facto
parent, an individual must (1) have the support and consent of the child’s parent; (2) have exercised
parental responsibility for the child; and (3) have acted as a parent for an amount of time sufficient
for the child to have bonded with and depended on the individual seeking de facto parent status).
44 968 A.2d 1 (Del. 2009).
45 Id. at 2-3.
46 Id. at 16.
47 See, e.g., Nancy Polikoff, Delaware Got It Wrong; This Child Has Two Mothers, BEYOND
(STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE (Feb. 11, 2009), http://beyondstraightandgaymarriage.blogspot.com/
2009/02/delaware-got-it-wrong-this-child-has.html [https://perma.cc/TUN4-ZTR4] (criticizing the
Gordon holding and suggesting a legislative solution).
48 Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 936 (Del. 2011).
49 IND. CODE § 31-9-2-35.5 (2018) (deﬁning “de facto custodian” as one who has been the
primary caregiver for, and ﬁnancial support of, a child who the person has resided with for a
required minimum period).
42
43

988

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 975

Columbia50 have codified the de facto parenthood doctrine legislatively, and
many others have adopted it judicially.51
The related “holding out” doctrine52 provides that one who “holds out” a
child as his own and establishes a personal, ﬁnancial, or custodial
relationship with the child is presumed to be a parent, with the attendant
rights and obligations.53 To the extent that the de facto and holding out
doctrines are available as a means to demonstrate parentage, they create
another avenue for same-sex parents to establish their legal-parent status
and have been successfully invoked by same-sex couples.54
Although many states accept the de facto parent and related functional
parenting doctrines, nearly half of the states reject these theories.55
Additionally, utilization of intended parent concepts requires the passage of
time and expense of litigation. Therefore, although the states are trending
toward recognizing the legal status of a functional, intended parent,56
D.C. CODE § 16-831.03 (2019) (providing that a de facto parent has standing to seek custody).
See, e.g., Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 451 (Md. 2016) (recognizing, unanimously, the
de facto parent doctrine and overturning a longstanding precedent that considered de facto status to
be insufficient to establish standing); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 177 (Wash. 2005) (holding
that a de facto parent stands in legal parity with a legal parent); A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 1070
(Mass. 2006) (defining “de facto parent” and clarifying that one who holds this status is a legal
parent); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 435-36 (Wis. 1995) (adopting a four-part test
to maintain standing as a de facto parent); see also Harris, supra note 8, at 61 (noting that “eighteen
[states] have cases that recognize a relationship called ‘de facto parent,’ ‘psychological parent,’ or
person standing ‘in loco parentis’”).
52 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 201(b)(1), 204(a)(5) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N amended 2002)
(providing that a man who resides in the same home as the child for the first two years of his life and takes
the child into his home and/or holds out the child as his own is rebuttably presumed to be the father).
53 See, e.g., Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283, 288, 297 (N.M. 2012) (finding that the same-sex
partner of the adoptive parent of a child was entitled to a presumption of parentage based on the
holding out provision of the jurisdiction’s parental presumption and therefore holding that she had
standing to petition for custody as a natural mother); Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 66970 (Cal. 2005) (upholding an order imposing a child support obligation on a woman who supported
her partner’s artificial insemination and held the resulting child out as her own but later disclaimed
financial responsibility for the child).
54 See, e.g., Partanen v. Gallagher, 59 N.E.3d 1133, 1138 (Mass. 2016) (holding that a former same-sex
partner who sought to establish legal parentage of the children born to her former partner during the
course of their relationship was entitled to do so, despite the lack of a biological connection, because she
had openly held out the children as her own and jointly received them into her home).
55 See
De Facto Parenting Statutes, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT,
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/de_facto_parenting_statutes
[https://perma.cc/9XZZM3GE] (mapping thirty states that recognize de facto parenthood in some form, six states that do
not recognize de facto parent status, and fourteen states that are ambivalent on the question); see
also Harris supra note 8, at 66 (“[W]hile the de facto parent doctrine and related theories protect
functional parent–child relationships where they are recognized, they have not been adopted in
almost half the states.”).
56 See, e.g., Partanen, 59 N.E.3d at 1142 (recognizing a nonbiological parent’s status where she
was an active participant in her partner’s pregnancy and openly held out the children as her own);
Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 500 (N.Y. 2016) (rejecting the longstanding Alison
50
51
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despite a lack of marital or biological connection, this development is
insuﬃcient to completely eliminate the full faith and credit problem for
same-sex couples, even as it marks an important step forward in eﬀorts to
adjust domestic relations laws in light of the increasingly diverse structure
of today’s families. The variance in the ability of a same-sex parent to use a
de facto parent theory to establish their status illustrates another way in
which parentage may be in ﬂux as a same-sex couple moves geographically
across the United States and underscores the importance of providing a
meaningful resolution to this problem.
4. Second-Parent Adoption
Fourth, there is signiﬁcant variation in the availability of second-parent
adoption across the states. Proper treatment of adoption is conceptually
complex because it is both a part of the problem (due to variability in the
availability of second-parent adoption) and part of the solution (due to the
full faith and credit recognition given to adoption decrees).
Differences in adoption policy cause difficulty for a same-sex couple who
pursues a second-parent adoption because a majority of jurisdictions do not
provide for this practice.57 Second-parent adoption58 provides a legal
mechanism through which a nonmarital same-sex parent can validly adopt her
partner’s biological or adoptive child.59 In a second-parent adoption, the
existing parent does not have to relinquish her right to custody, making this
apparatus especially effective as a means for the nonlegal parent in a same-sex
partnership to formalize her status. The primary impediment to obtaining a
D. bright-line rule restricting legal parent status to biological or adoptive parents and granting a
nonbiological, nonadoptive parent standing to petition for custody because she entered into a
preconception agreement with her former partner to conceive and raise a child as coparents);
Sinnott v. Peck, 180 A.3d 560, 569-73 (Vt. 2017) (recognizing “limited circumstances” in which a de
facto parent theory can be invoked and discussing factors that should be considered).
57 See infra notes 66–69 and accompanying discussion (summarizing the variability in the
availability of second-parent adoption).
58 Akin to a stepparent adoption, the existing legal parent in a second-parent adoption is not
required to relinquish parental rights. This contrasts with traditional adoption, where cutoff
provisions require both birth parents of the child to relinquish all legal rights to the child in order
for the adoption to be validly effectuated. See Jane S. Schachter, Constructing Families in a Democracy:
Court, Legislatures and Second-Parent Adoption, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 933, 936-38 (2000) (discussing
requirements for traditional adoption, stepparent adoption, and second-parent adoption).
59 Although second-parent adoptions are commonly pursued by lesbian partners where the
legal parent is also the birth mother, a second-parent adoption may also be pursued where the legal
mother has individually adopted the child and her partner later wishes to adopt the child as well.
See, e.g., In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 691-92 (Surr. Ct. 2009) (analyzing whether
full faith and credit recognition was due to an out-of-state adoption decree obtained by the samesex partner of an adoptive mother). Regardless of whether the legal mother’s parental status
derives from biology or adoption, the result is the same: her parental rights and responsibilities
will not be aﬀected by the grant of second-parent status to her partner.
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second-parent adoption is securing the relinquishment of the parental rights
of the other biological parent.60 The rationale underlying this impediment is
the basic principle that a child can only have two legal parents.61
Because second-parent adoption is available regardless of the marital status of
the parties, it has commonly been used by same-sex couples to ensure
recognition of the nonlegal parent’s status vis-à-vis the child. With the
legalization of same-sex marriage under Obergefell, theoretically stepparent
adoption will be available equally to same-sex couples as it is to opposite-sex
couples. Therefore, to the extent that the unavailability of a valid marital
relationship was the impetus for a same-sex couple to pursue a second-parent
adoption, as opposed to a stepparent adoption, that bar will be mitigated.62
Nonetheless, there are other reasons same-sex couples may choose to pursue
second-parent adoption,63 and it continues to be a critical means of ensuring that
the nonlegal partner’s parental rights enjoy full faith and credit protection.64

60 When the child is conceived through artificial insemination using anonymous sperm
donation, often the fertility clinic will act as an intermediary, requiring the donor to sign a contract
extinguishing his parental rights. See, e.g., Model Known Donor Agreement, GLBTQ LEGAL
ADVOCS. & DEFENDERS, https://www.glad.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/MassachusettsKnown-Donor-Agreement-Model.pdf [https://perma.cc/PAJ9-RLDH] (providing sample sperm
donor agreement expressly removing any right to custody that may be claimed by the donor or
obligation for support that may be sought by the recipient).
61 In narrow circumstances, exceptions to this rule have been made. See, e.g., Finnerty v.
Boyett, 469 So.2d 287, 289-90, 297 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (allowing the biological father of a child
born shortly after the mother married another man to establish paternity and visitation rights
despite the statutory presumption of parentage for the husband, eﬀectively providing that the
child had three parents). However, these exceptions are aberrational, and the weight of legislation
and case law supports the longstanding two-parent paradigm.
62 Prior to Obergefell, the inability to obtain valid marital status was indeed an impediment to
the ability of a same-sex partner to successfully pursue a stepparent adoption, even where the
marriage had been validly issued in a state recognizing same-sex marriage. See In re Adoption of
K.R.S., 109 So.3d 176, 178 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) (concluding that despite the fact that two samesex women were validly married in California, “under Alabama law, [the prospective adoptive
parent’s] marriage to the child’s mother is not recognized . . . accordingly, [she] may not adopt the
child pursuant to [the provision of the code], which allows adoptions by a stepparent”).
63 For example, a same-sex couple pursuing an international adoption may be disqualiﬁed
based on their sexual orientation if the foreign country looks disfavorably upon such relationships.
See Ian Parker, What Makes a Parent, NEW YORKER (May 22, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/22/what-makes-a-parent [https://perma.cc/5EHWUCKF] (discussing the lengths that the adoptive parent went to in protecting her sexual
orientation and listing her partner as a roommate to ensure she was not disqualiﬁed from
international adoption); see also Julie Shapiro, The Law Governing LGBT-Parent Families, in LGBTPARENT FAMILIES: INNOVATIONS IN RESEARCH AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 297
(Abbie E. Goldberg & Katherine R. Allen eds., 2013). For a same-sex couple in this situation, it is
not uncommon for one parent to pursue the international adoption, with the other parent
intending to procure a second-parent adoption once the international adoption is complete.
64 See, e.g., In re Adoption of a Minor, 29 N.E.3d 830, 832 (Mass. 2015) (listing a desire to ensure
“recognition of their parentage when they travel outside the Commonwealth” as a reason for seeking
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The possibility of obtaining a second-parent adoption is not an adequate
means to protect same-sex parentage because the availability of this practice
is limited. In fact, only fourteen states explicitly allow second-parent
adoption.65 Some states go further than being silent on the availability of
the practice, aﬃrmatively refusing to grant it.66
Conversely, just because a state does not explicitly provide for second-parent
adoption does not mean that such an adoption will never be granted. One theory
justifying second-parent adoption, even in the absence of a positive legislative
right, is that the adoption serves the best interests of the child.67 For example, a
second-parent adoption was granted in Washington, notwithstanding the
statutory silence on whether such a remedy is available.68 Contrariwise, even in
jurisdictions allowing second-parent adoption, it is by no means guaranteed, as
courts authorized to recognize such an adoption have nonetheless refused to do
so for reasons unrelated to the merits of the adoption petition, putting the
security of same-sex parentage at great risk.69 As illustrated, the variability in the
an adoption); In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 691-92 (Surr. Ct. 2009) (pursuing a
second-parent adoption to ensure recognition of their legal parentage throughout the United States).
65 California, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Vermont all explicitly allow same-sex
couples to seek a second-parent adoption. See LGBT Adoption Statistics, LIFELONG ADOPTIONS,
https://www.lifelongadoptions.com/lgbt-adoption/lgbt-adoption-statistics [https://perma.cc/5DA6-NGC2].
Additionally, some counties in other states have granted second-parent adoptions to unmarried same-sex
couples in Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS,
BY
LGBT
PARENTS
(2018),
http://www.nclrights.org/wpADOPTION
content/uploads/2013/07/2PA_state_list.pdf [https://perma.cc/FW48-4942].
66 For example, the Nebraska Supreme Court refused to grant an adoption to the companion
of a biological parent on the theory that, because the biological parent had not relinquished her
parental rights, the child was not eligible for adoption. In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374,
382 (Neb. 2002). Employing similar reasoning, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin concluded that
the “cut-oﬀ provision” of the state’s adoption statute was mandatory, thereby blocking the samesex spouse of a biological mother from validly adopting her child, despite the fact that the
biological father knowingly consented to a termination of his parental rights (because the
biological mother had not relinquished her rights). In Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678,
684 (Wis. 1994). Finally, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that limited judicial subject
matter jurisdiction over adoption meant that all second-parent adoptions were void ab initio.
Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 496 (N.C.2010).
67 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 541 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1995) (providing that the “best interests of the child” standard governs the propriety of
granting a second-parent adoption, and ﬁnding that where the children are “fully bonded [to both
parents by] ties of mutual aﬀection” that threshold is satisﬁed).
68 See Carrie Bashaw, Comment, Protecting Children in Nontraditional Families: Second Parent
Adoptions in Washington, 13 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 321, 337 (1990) (describing the grant of
second-parent adoption in In re the Interest of E.B.G., even though such an adoption “may not have
been contemplated speciﬁcally by the legislature”).
69 See, e.g., In re Seb C-M, 2014 NYLJ LEXIS 5518, at *3 (Surr. Ct. Jan. 31, 2014) (refusing to
grant the adoption petition of a same-sex couple, despite the abundant case law and statutory
authority permitting the practice, because the court found no reason to “affirm an existing,
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availability of second-parent adoption is vast due to differences in both statutory
provisions for this process and judicially imposed limitations. Therefore, for an
unmarried same-sex couple who wishes to formalize the nonlegal partner’s
status, adoption is not guaranteed to be an available solution.
In summary, while some progress has been made in terms of recognizing
the legal status of parents in same-sex families, most notably exempliﬁed
through updates to longstanding doctrines such as the marital presumption,
law on surrogacy, de facto parenthood, and second-parent adoption, these
advances do not entirely solve the problem. The changes, while laudable,
remain insuﬃcient to provide complete legal protection for two reasons.
First, where the status of the nonbiological same-sex parent is recognized
in a court judgment due to application of the marital presumption or de facto
parenthood doctrine—and would be entitled to full faith and credit recognition
outside of the forum—this result only obtains after the case is fully litigated;
however, an interstate recognition problem may arise before the couple has the
opportunity to prove their parentage. For example, parentage based on a de
facto parent theory, a holding out theory, or a formalized second-parent
adoption order requires time to demonstrate the parent’s functional role.
However, if the couple travels or moves across jurisdictions before adequate
time to prove conduct exemplary of parental status has passed, they risk the
possibility that their parentage will not be recognized.
Second, where parentage is based on application of the marital
presumption, this statutory status will ordinarily not be formally
memorialized in a judgment unless the parties separate and pursue litigation
to adjudicate custody.70 Therefore, for a same-sex couple whose parental
status is guaranteed under the marital presumption or artificial insemination
rule of their home state, this status may nonetheless be at risk. If the family
travels interstate as an intact unit, there is a possibility that under the laws of
a neighboring jurisdiction, the nonbiological individual’s parentage will not

recognized and protected parent-child relationship”). There is abundant case law trending in the
other direction as well—granting adoption in circumstances where the petitioner’s parentage would
have been protected under the laws of the state. See, e.g., In re Adoption of a Minor, 29 N.E.3d at
833 (granting a second-parent adoption to the nonbiological lesbian parent notwithstanding the fact
that her parentage was recognized under the state’s artificial insemination statute); In re L, No. A11966/15, 2016 WL 5943053, at *15 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Oct. 6, 2016) (allowing same-sex couples to adopt
notwithstanding the fact that their parentage was already recognized under New York’s family law
and highlighting the full faith and credit issues implicated by international travel in addition to the
uncertainty risked by domestic movement); In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 692
(Surr. Ct. 2009) (granting adoption judgment under the best interests standard, even though an
adoption “should be unnecessary because [the child] was born to parents whose marriage is legally
recognized in this state,” providing a presumption of parentage).
70 See Harris, supra note 8, at 84 (noting that even with marital presumption and artificial
insemination rules, “[r]elationships remain vulnerable to disruption” because of the possibility of litigation).

2019]

The Birth Certificate Solution

993

be recognized, and the parents will not have a formalized decree from their
home state. Moreover, until recently, marital status was largely unavailable to
same-sex couples, making the presumption of legal parenthood out of reach,
and it continues to be inapplicable where the couple is unmarried.
The possibility of refusal to recognize parentage is not a problem that
besets the traditional opposite-sex couple. This challenge is unique in the
same-sex context where the nonlegal partner’s relationship to the child is
based on intent and function, rather than biology. Because various domestic
relations doctrines developed against a backdrop of opposite-sex couples
consisting of one male and female, existing laws are insuﬃcient when
applied to family structures that do not ﬁt this mold.71 Given the
inadequacies of the one mother–one father framework to provide
predictability and stability to the modern same-sex family, a solution tied to
the unique circumstances of these diverse family compositions is necessary.
B. Overview of Proposed and Existing Solutions
In recognition of the ever-increasing magnitude of the uncertainty faced
by same-sex couples, and given the transiency of individuals and families
and the increasing rate at which same-sex families are being formed,72 there
have been calls for a cohesive response to the problem.
Proposed policy solutions include congressional implementation of an
interstate registry for establishing the parentage of children born through
artificial reproduction assistance,73 use of the parental rights and family
autonomy principles of the Fourteenth Amendment to guide resolution of
cases where the recognition of a parent–child relationship across state lines is
in question,74 and development of legislative solutions such as uniform

71 See, e.g., Q.M. v. B.C., 995 N.Y.S.2d 470, 475-76 (Fam. Ct. 2014) (ﬁnding that the
biological mother’s same-sex marital partner was not the child’s second mother, citing the
biological impossibility of the parental relationship and the desire of the father to exercise his
parental rights as factors supporting the holding).
72 See Characteristics of Same-Sex Couple Households: 2005 to Present, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/same-sex-couples/ssc-house-characteristics.html
[https://perma.cc/F3RB-AG4L] (showing consistent increases in the number of same-sex spousal
couples and same-sex unmarried partner couples from 2005 to 2015).
73 See Courtney G. Joslin, Travel Insurance: Protecting Lesbian and Gay Parent Families Across State
Lines, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 43 (2010) (suggesting implementation of a registration system for
children born through assisted reproduction pursuant to Congress’s full faith and credit power).
74 See Sanders, supra note 19, at 269 (“The simple rule should be that legal parenthood, once
properly established under one state’s law, is a legal status that endures unless and until it is
terminated in a proceeding that satisﬁes the standards of due process as speciﬁed by the Supreme
Court.”). Other scholars have argued that a refusal to recognize validly established parental rights
is functionally equivalent to an unconstitutional termination of those rights. See id. at 267 n.168
(summarizing the positions of two scholars on this issue).
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adoption of the de facto parent doctrine75 or implementation of the recently
amended Uniform Parentage Act (UPA).76 While all of these solutions would
provide a greater degree of protection to the parentage of same-sex couples,
effective implementation is complicated and would require the passage of
time. Given the importance of protecting parental status for the safety of the
child and cohesion of the family unit, a more immediate solution is needed.
Adoption also exists as an accessible solution because it is well settled
that an adoption judgment77 must be recognized in other states, regardless
of whether the adoption would be recognized under the forum’s laws.
Indeed, formalizing parental status through an adoption ensures that the
legal status of the nonbirth parent will be respected, as the Supreme Court
has deemed such a judgment to be of the type entitled to an “exacting” full
faith and credit obligation.78 Because a formal adoption decree objectively
establishes parentage, regardless of biological connection or marital status,
many advocates urge same-sex couples to obtain an adoption judgment.79
See Harris, supra note 8, at 85.
Courtney G. Joslin, Nurturing Parenthood Through the UPA (2017), 127 YALE L.J.F. 589, 589
(2018) (arguing that by adopting the recently amended UPA, “states can reform parentage law to
more evenhandedly protect all parent–child relationships”).
77 Final adjudications on adoption petitions are variously referred to as decrees, orders, and
judgments. Regardless of the phraseology, these ﬁnal decisions on the merits of the adoption
petition are functionally equivalent to a “judgment” within the meaning of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. See Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1152 n.12 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is clear that
all such decisions are ‘judgments’ under the common deﬁnition of the term . . . .”).
78 V.L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1020 (2016); see, e.g., Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1156 (overturning an
amendment that refused to recognize ﬁnal adoption orders of other states that permitted adoption
by same-sex couples because “ﬁnal adoption orders and decrees are judgments that are entitled to
recognition by all other states under the Full Faith and Credit Clause”); Bates v. Bates, 730 S.E.2d
482, 484 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that although it was “doubtful” whether Georgia law
permitted second-parent adoption, a prior ruling regarding whether a challenge to the secondparent adoption was time barred was determinative as to the validity of the adoption decree in a
subsequent action regarding custody of the child); Giancaspro v. Congleton, No. 283267, 2009 WL
416301, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2009) (recognizing the validity of an Illinois second-parent
adoption in Michigan, pursuant to which both mothers were permitted to seek custody under the
Michigan custody provisions); Russell v. Bridgens, 647 N.W.2d 56, 59 (Neb. 2002) (“A judgment
rendered in a sister state court which had jurisdiction is to be given full faith and credit and has
the same validity and eﬀect in [the new forum] as in the state rendering judgment.”).
79 See, e.g., GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS, MARRIAGE TIPS AND TRAPS 8
(2012),
http://legacy.glad.org/uploads/docs/publications/marriage-tips-traps.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DVW2-QB3P] (acknowledging that while the marital presumption as applied to
protect the parentage of same-sex couples is “good, . . . it is not the same level of protection as
[the] family would gain by going through the legal process of jointly adopting any child born
during the marriage”); LAMBDA LEGAL, CIVIL UNIONS FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES IN NEW
JERSEY
5-6,
https://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/ﬁles/publications/downloads/fs_civilunions-for-ss-couples-in-nj_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8TV-QTDY] (noting that the marital
“presumption does not have the same eﬀect as a court judgment” and therefore recommending
securing the legal relationship with both parents through adoption); see also Elizabeth A. Harris,
Same-Sex Parents Still Face Legal Complications, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2017),
75
76
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Indeed, family law attorneys urge same-sex couples to pursue adoption not
only for the full faith and credit protection it provides, but also because it
may be essential in safeguarding the parental rights of the nonbiological
parent in the event of dissolution of the relationship.80 Additionally, if the
child is taken abroad, a foreign country may be more willing to recognize
parental rights if they are reﬂected in a judicial order,81 particularly if the
same-sex marriage would not be recognized by the country.
Although there are many beneﬁts to obtaining a formal adoption order,
relying on the adoption process as the sole way of protecting the
nonbiological partner’s parental status is inadequate. First, pursuing an
adoption may be prohibitively expensive for some couples,82 making formal
legal status realistically unattainable.83 Second, for an unmarried same-sex
couple, adoption may be unavailable due to diﬀerences in state policy on
second-parent adoption.84 Third, a couple cannot obtain an adoption until
after the child has been born, so this does not solve the full faith and credit
problem for the early months of the child’s life; if the couple travels during
this time, there is a possibility that the nonbiological parent’s status vis-à-vis
the child will not be recognized. Finally, the adoption protocol is invasive,
and as a matter of principle, some same-sex couples resist going through the
process due to the belief that they should not have to take steps that are not
required of opposite-sex couples.85
https://www.nytimes.com/ 2017/06/20/us/gay-pride-lgbtq-same-sex-parents.html (quoting the
owner of an LGBTQ family law ﬁrm as noting that “[y]ou’ll always be safer in more-conservative
states and more-conservative countries if parentage is reliant on an adoption rather than on samesex marriage”).
80 See, e.g., Embry v. Ryan, 11 So. 3d 408, 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that full
faith and credit was owed to a Washington second-parent adoption and therefore the adoptive
mother who was the former same-sex partner of the biological mother was entitled to custody
rights as any adoptive parent would be).
81 See generally, Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
art. 3(b), Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 (explaining that the right of custody
may arise "by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having
legal eﬀect under the law of th[e] State” where the child was habitually residing).
82 See, e.g., How Much Does Adoption Cost?, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/
resources/how-much-does-adoption-cost [https://perma.cc/MJ42-L8Q9] (last visited Mar. 5, 2019)
(estimating that the average cost for a second-parent adoption ranges from $2000 to $3000,
inclusive of home study costs and attorneys' fees).
83 Joslin, supra note 73, at 43; see also Chang, supra note 15 (describing the $3500 outlay a
Washington, D.C. couple expended in procuring a second-parent adoption for the nonbiological
same-sex partner); Harris, supra note 79 (summarizing the steps required of a New York couple to
obtain a second-parent adoption, including being ﬁngerprinted, providing a comprehensive
background, completing home visits, and spending $4000).
84 See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of uniformity of state
legislative and judicial policy on second-parent adoptions).
85 See Chang, supra note 15 (citing couples who described the second-parent adoption process
as “humiliating,” “absurd,” and “frustrating”).
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In summary, although obtaining a formalized judgment of adoption is an
absolute means to ensure that a nonbiological parent’s status is recognized
nationwide, this solution is not independently sufficient because it is not
universally available for an unmarried same-sex couple, and even where it is
available, it may not be financially viable. Thus, even with the possibility of
adoption, full faith and credit issues still loom large for many same-sex
couples who travel interstate, and a more uniform solution is required if this
problem is to be meaningfully resolved. Entitling the birth certificate to full
faith and credit recognition as a “record” would provide greater immediate
predictability to the uncertainty faced by same-sex parents because with the
increasing willingness of states to grant birth certificates listing both samesex partners as parents,86 this is a presently implementable solution.
II. DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS OF BIRTH CERTIFICATES UNDER THE
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
The opening clause of Article IV of the United States Constitution
provides, “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”87 This Part
analyzes the three categories of full faith and credit jurisprudence as they
relate to questions of family law, particularly same-sex parentage, concluding
that the birth certificate most naturally fits within the scope of “records.”
A. Judicial Proceedings
Supreme Court interpretation of “judicial proceedings” has affirmed that
the full faith and credit obligation as regards final determinations is “exacting.”88
Perhaps the fullest expression of the power of the Full Faith and Credit Clause

86 See, e.g., Birth Certificate Update Following Barrier v. Vasterling, MO. DEP’T HEALTH & SENIOR
SERVS., http://health.mo.gov/data/vitalrecords/birthcertificateupdate.php [https://perma.cc/6ZGCS9KW] (proscribing that both partners of married same-sex couples who give birth in Missouri will be
listed on the child’s birth certificate); AJ Trager, State Now Recognizing Married Same-Sex Parents on Birth
Certificates,
PRIDESOURCE
(July
23,
2015),
https://pridesource.com/article/72408-2
[https://perma.cc/BC9Y-7SR3] (summarizing the new policy of the State of Michigan Vital Records
Department, according to which the same-sex spouse of a biological parent will be listed on a child’s birth
certificate); Beth Walton, New Birth Certificate Rules Recognize Lesbian Mothers, CITIZEN TIMES (May 15,
2015, 6:26 PM), https://www.citizen-times.com/story/news/local/2015/05/15/new-birth-certificate-rulesrecognize-lesbian-mothersnew-birth-certificate-guidelines-welcome-news-lesbian-parents/27400819/
[https://perma.cc/UVF6-UCYP] (describing changes in the policies of North Carolina Vital Records,
which requires the state to issue birth certificates with both same-sex parents listed).
87 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
88 Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998); see also id. (“A ﬁnal judgment in one
State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons
governed by the judgment, qualiﬁes for recognition throughout the land.”).
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for judicial proceedings was captured by Fauntleroy v. Lum,89 where the
Supreme Court held that Mississippi was required to enforce a Missouri
judgment holding one party financially responsible for a futures contract, despite
the fact that gambling in futures was prohibited under Mississippi law.90
In the context of family law, the “exacting” obligation owed to a judicial
proceeding ensures that a custody determination is entitled to unqualified
recognition in a sister state, and the case law demonstrates that this result is
well settled. For example, in Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins,91 the Court of
Appeals of Virginia awarded full faith and credit to a custody determination,
reflected in a judicial order, adjudicated in Vermont Family Court that
granted the nonbiological partner in a same-sex relationship visitation rights
to the child of the couple, even though the civil union, which was the basis for
the finding of parentage, likely would not have been recognized in Virginia.92
However, birth certificates do not fall within the ambit of the judicial
proceedings category because they are not “rendered by a court with
adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons governed by the
judgment” following full, adversarial litigation.93 Therefore, the exacting
obligation owed to judicial proceedings does not support the propriety of
entitling birth certificates to full faith and credit protection because this
category is inapposite. Although the guarantee of nationwide recognition of
litigated custody determinations provides a modicum of protection to samesex parents, it is insufficient as a complete solution because recognition
problems may arise before there is a need to obtain a court decision, and
therefore the parentage of the nonbiological parent in an intact same-sex
family may be unprotected when traveling interstate.
B. Public Acts
Similarly, the Supreme Court has unambiguously interpreted the term
“public Acts” to refer to statutes.94 However, rather than entitling public
acts to the exacting obligation that is guaranteed to judicial proceedings, the
Court has clariﬁed that a lower level of deference is required; that is, the
forum state only needs to provide full faith and credit if the statute of the
sister state does not violate the public policy of the forum.95 The diverging

210 U.S. 230 (1908).
Id. at 237.
637 S.E.2d 330 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
Id. at 337-38.
Baker, 522 U.S. at 233.
Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 411 (1955).
See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979) (“[T]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not
require a State to apply another State’s law in violation of its own legitimate public policy.”).
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
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treatment between judicial proceedings and public acts derives from the
diﬀerence in “the full faith and credit owed to other states’ laws, which
permits the second forum to refuse recognition based on its own public
policy, versus the full faith and credit owed to other states’ judgments and
decrees, which leaves no room for nonrecognition based on public policy.”96
For example, in Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident
Commission,97 the Supreme Court upheld the denial of full faith and credit
recognition to the substantive provisions of a sister state’s workmen’s
compensation act because the policy of the sister state was obnoxious to the
policy of the forum, and “[f]ull faith and credit does not . . . enable one state to
legislate for the other or to project its laws across state lines so as to preclude
the other from prescribing for itself the legal consequences of acts within it.”98
This standard has been interpreted liberally with respect to the statutory
law of the forum, as full faith and credit recognition is not required where
the statute “deal[s] with a subject matter concerning [an issue] which [the
forum state] is competent to legislate.”99 More speciﬁcally, the Supreme
Court has recognized that “regulation of domestic relations is traditionally
the domain of state law,”100 so it is diﬃcult to conceive of a situation where
the forum state would not be competent to enact legislation on an issue such
as the parental status of the consenting, marital spouse of the birth mother
(who lacks a biological connection to the child).
Based on the foregoing principles that guide application of the full faith
and credit guarantee for public acts, it is equally clear that birth certificates do
not fit within this category. Invocation of the public acts category presupposes
litigation because the underlying question this category seeks to resolve is a
choice of which law—domicile or forum state—should apply. However, where
a same-sex couple has a birth certificate listing both partners as parents and
merely seeks recognition of that document in a sister state, designation as a
parent on the birth certificate with the resulting rights and responsibilities has
already been granted. Therefore, the question is not one of application as
between the law of the forum state and the law of the sister state, but rather
whether “rights acquired in a sister state must be respected in the forum.”101
Said differently, there is a mismatch between the birth certificate and the
public acts category of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
96 Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the
Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 290 n.371 (2006) (emphasis added).
97 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
98 Id. at 504-05.
99 Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) (quoting Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 306 U.S. at 501).
100 Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U.S. 483, 490 (2013).
101 Shawn Gebhardt, Comment, Full Faith and Credit for Status Records: A Reconsideration of
Gardiner, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1419, 1442 (2009).
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In summary, the birth certificate does not naturally fit within the
framework of the Court’s public acts jurisprudence because the theme
underlying challenges in this category is that there is a difference in the choice
of law to be applied. However, in the context of birth certificates, the
expression of the policy of the sister state is already encompassed in the birth
certificate. The couple is simply seeking recognition of its validity, and there is
no issue regarding whose law should be applied. Therefore, as with the judicial
proceedings category, the public acts prong of full faith and credit
jurisprudence is not instructive to the viability of the birth certificate solution.
C. Records
In comparison to the relatively robust jurisprudence on the judicial
proceedings and public acts categories of the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
the records class has received little attention.102 Records are considerably
diﬀerent from both judicial proceedings, in the sense that they are not the
product of adversarial proceedings, and public acts, in the sense that they
are not universally applicable but rather pertain exclusively to a particular
individual; therefore, it is unsupportable that they can be rolled into either
of these two categories.103 The obscurity of the proper treatment of such
records has been noted by numerous commentators104 and, in conjunction
with a recognition of the increasing signiﬁcance of records issued by state
executive oﬃces in citizens’ daily lives, has led to calls for clariﬁcation from
the Supreme Court or Congress.105
To the extent that birth certificates fall within the scope of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, they would be within the “records” category. This conclusion
derives from the language of the Act of March 27, 1804, in which Congress
clarified that the term “records” in the Full Faith and Credit Clause encompasses
both nonjudicial and judicial records.106 The 1804 Act, the second implementing
statute passed by Congress to effectuate the full faith and credit mandate

102 See Darren A. Prum, The Full Faith and Credit Clause: Do Factual Executive Documents
Require Equivalent Treatment Between States?, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 151, 153 (2012)
(expressing that only a “minimal amount” of attention has been paid to the executive record
category of the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Gebhardt, supra note 101, at 1444 (noting that “the
U.S. Supreme Court has . . . never clearly explained the level of full faith and credit that is due to
state executive documents”).
103 Gebhardt, supra note 101, at 1444.
104 See, e.g., supra note 102 and accompanying text.
105 See, e.g., Gebhardt, supra note 101, at 1444 (“The U.S. Supreme Court or Congress must
remedy this situation due to the great volume of executive decisions whose level of faith and credit
in sister states is unclear and due to the immense impact that such decisions have on our lives.”).
106 Act of Mar. 27, 1804, 2 Stat. 298 (1804) (current version codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1739 (2000)).
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pursuant to their power under the Effects Clause,107 specifically ensures full faith
and credit recognition for “all records and exemplifications of office books, which
are . . . kept in any public office of any state, not appertaining to a court.”108 The
explicit identification of state-issued executive records as deserving of full faith
and credit recognition supports the conclusion that the birth certificate is among
this class because it is registered with and filed by the state, commonly the
Department of Health.109 Congress’s expansive interpretation of the term
“records” to include state executive records indisputably indicates that birth
certificates fall within the scope of this category.
Birth certificates most naturally fit within the records group as indicated
by the language in the 1804 Act. However, due to the lack of guidance on the
level of legitimacy that other states must accord to records, the level of
deference they are owed is uncertain. Part III will articulate why, for
purposes of interstate recognition of parentage, birth certificates should be
entitled to a high level of deference. Notwithstanding the doctrinal
ambiguity, treating birth certificates as records entitled to full faith and
credit deference would meaningfully resolve the uncertainty faced by samesex couples in establishing parentage, and various doctrinal tenets underlying
both full faith and credit and family law jurisprudence confirm this result.
III. TREATING BIRTH CERTIFICATES AS RECORDS FOR PURPOSES OF
INTERSTATE RECOGNITION OF PARENTAGE
Treating birth certiﬁcates as “records” entitled to interstate recognition
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause would provide a greater degree of
protection to the parentage of same-sex couples. If the status of two samesex parents as listed on the child’s birth certiﬁcate is entitled to full faith
and credit weight, same-sex parents will have assurance that their parentage
will be respected in sister states, whether the birth certiﬁcate is used in the
process of performing menial tasks such as school registration or in more
dire circumstances, such as ensuring decisionmaking power in the event of

107 The Effects Clause confers on Congress the power to “prescribe the Manner in which such
Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2.
108 Act of Mar. 27, 1804, 2 Stat. at 298.
109 See, e.g., Birth, Death and Marriage Records, R.I. DEP’T OF HEALTH,
http://www.health.ri.gov/records/ [https://perma.cc/LFQ9-5P6R] (establishing the state
department of health as the record holder for vital statistics); Vital Records, CAL. DEP’T PUB.
HEALTH (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHSI/Pages/Vital-Records.aspx
[https://perma.cc/474H-NUXF] (designating the maintenance of vital statistic records, such as
birth certiﬁcates, as the responsibility of the state department of health); Vital Statistics Records,
PA. HIST. & MUSEUM COMMISSION, http://www.phmc.pa.gov/Archives/ResearchOnline/Pages/Vital-Statistics.aspx [https://perma.cc/3SLV-GYKJ] (identifying the state
department of health as the issuer of birth and death certiﬁcates).
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an emergency.110 Not only is this solution practical, but it is also doctrinally
tenable because the birth certiﬁcate has historically been treated as a critical
indicator of parentage. Both the Court and Congress have highlighted the
need for certainty regarding status determinations, and principles
underlying recent Supreme Court decisions in the family law context
support the societal signiﬁcance attached to birth certiﬁcates. Moreover,
judicially developed limitations on the full faith and credit doctrine do not
undermine the feasibility of this solution.
A. Existing Treatment as a Critical Indicator of Parentage
In its earliest form, the birth certiﬁcate served to compile vital statistics
and record population information, primarily for purposes of taxation and
ascertaining military resources.111 The document took on heightened
signiﬁcance in the early American colonies as it provided a way to protect
individual rights, most notably for property.112 The establishment of the
U.S. Bureau of the Census centralized the collection of birth information on
a national level, a responsibility that now belongs to the National Center for
Health Statistics (NCHS).113 Today, NCHS provides a standard for birth
certiﬁcation that is supplemented by individual states, which have the
ultimate responsibility for registration.114
Birth certiﬁcates have evolved considerably and today symbolize far
more than birth registration. Modern societal norms regard birth certiﬁcates
with enormous signiﬁcance, as these “slips of paper . . . imbued with
political and social meaning”115 are used for activities ranging from school
and sports registration116 to securing various state entitlements, such as a
110 For a tragic illustration of the importance of legal status in emergency situations, consider
the consequences of the court’s refusal to recognize the parentage of the nonbiological parent in
Nancy S. v. Michele G. 279 Cal. Rptr. 3d 212 (Ct. App. 1991). Six years after the unsuccessful
custody litigation, the biological parent was involved in a fatal car accident, but because the
nonbiological second mother was not a parent in the eyes of the law, she was not contacted or
consulted on questions of the child’s medical care following the accident. Id. at 215-16, 219. The
child nearly became a ward of the state. Elaine Herscher, Family Circle, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 29,
1999, 4:00 AM), https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Family-Circle-For-Nancy-Springer-a-1991court-2911717.php [https://perma.cc/4UL5-EESQ].
111 H.L. Brumberg, D. Dozor & S.G. Golombek, History of the Birth Certificate: From Inception
to the Future of Electronic Data, 32 J. PERINATOLOGY 407, 407 (2012).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 407-08.
114 Id. at 408.
115 Christine Ro, A Birth Certificate Is a Person’s First Possession, ATLANTIC (Dec. 10, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/12/a-birth-certiﬁcate-is-a-persons-ﬁrstpossession/547970/ [https://perma.cc/NY9Y-NN2C].
116 Failure to be listed as a parent on a birth certificate can lead to hardship in completing these
activities. See Eyder Peralta, Texas Fights Suit After Denying Birth Certificates to Children of Illegal Immigrants,
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driver’s or marriage license.117 The importance of the parties listed as
“parents” on the birth certiﬁcate is also societally recognized as signiﬁcant.
Designation as a parent on the birth certiﬁcate entitles the parent to
many rights, including being listed as an emergency contact; making
emergency medical decisions; and conducting ﬁnancial transactions, such as
setting up a bank account, on the child’s behalf. Moreover, a parent–child
relationship as reﬂected in the birth certiﬁcate can be crucial to the child’s
entitlement to various state-provided services, as a birth certiﬁcate may be
required to demonstrate eligibility for Social Security beneﬁts, inclusion in
a parent’s health insurance plan, child support, and inheritance rights.118
Additionally, parent status as reﬂected in the birth certiﬁcate can be
important in the event of international travel, as a parent applying for a
passport for a minor child must provide documentary evidence of
parentage, which may be established by the birth certiﬁcate.119 More
fundamentally, failure to be listed as a parent on the child’s birth certiﬁcate
may stigmatize the child, implying that his family arrangement is not
worthy of recognition.120 The eﬀects of this prejudice also impact the samesex parents, reinforcing the inferiority of their relationship by excluding an
important incident of parentage.
These harms, which result from the inability to obtain a birth certificate,
are far from theoretical. In contesting a state registrar’s refusal to grant a
supplemental birth certificate, the same-sex parents of a child whom they
validly adopted described the “great difficulty” in enrolling the child as a
dependent for health insurance coverage. They further described an incident
at an airport where they were asked for the child’s birth certificate to confirm
their parental relationship.121 The overwhelming importance attached to
parental status in the birth certificate is evidenced by the fact that this
document is required for participation in a wide variety of activities.
NPR (July 23, 2015, 10:38 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/07/23/425568894/texasfights-suit-after-denying-birth-certificates-to-children-of-illegal-immigr [https://perma.cc/7RZE-H8NH]
(describing how a mother whose child was denied a birth certificate “face[d] serious problems in enrolling
her daughter in day care, traveling with her child, obtaining necessary medical care and other health,
education and welfare services requiring parental consent”).
117 Seven Instances When You’ll Need a Birth Certificate, VITALCHEK (Aug. 7, 2014),
https://blog.vitalchek.com/birth-certificates/seven-instances-youll-need-birth-certificate/
[https://perma.cc/6WBL-FA5E].
118 Shohreh Davoodi, Note, More Than a Piece of Paper: Same-Sex Parents and Their Adopted Children
Are Entitled to Equal Protection in the Realm of Birth Certificates, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 703, 708 (2015).
119 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.28(a)(2), (a)(3)(ii) (2018).
120 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (No. 16-992), 2017
WL 587527, at *7 (“The children will face this stigma throughout their lives, as they look to and use
their birth certificates as an official record of their own identity and the identity of their parents.”).
121 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Adar v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011) (No. 11-0046), 2011
WL 2689011.
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In addition to the various entitlements that ﬂow from parental
designation on the birth certiﬁcate, many state statutes provide that after an
adoption decree is granted, a new birth certiﬁcate must be granted.122
Importantly, although the adoption decree is the document that legally
establishes parental status,123 “birth certiﬁcates are important documents
and . . . a failure to issue them with all of the correct information included
can create real problems for the families involved.”124 That a change in the
formal legal status of the parties necessitates a need for issuance of a new
birth certiﬁcate indicates that, just as societal norms attach signiﬁcance to
the parental information listed in the birth certiﬁcate, so do state
legislatures.125 Moreover, the signiﬁcance of the birth certiﬁcate as an
indicator of parentage is underscored by the numerous cases that have
arisen over the refusal to issue a supplemental birth certiﬁcate listing both
same-sex partners as parents, either in the ﬁrst instance126 or after the
122 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-9A-12(a)(1) (2018) (“The State Registrar shall establish a new
certiﬁcate of birth . . . upon receipt of . . . [a] report of adoption . . . .”); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 102635(a) (West 2018) (same); FLA. STAT. § 382.015 (1) (2018) (same); IOWA CODE
§ 144.21 (2017) (same); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 2765(1)(A) (2017) (same); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 4138(1)(c) (McKinney 2019) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-310(1) (2018). Similarly,
many states mandate that a new birth certiﬁcate be issued if another type of judgment establishing
legal parenthood is entered. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 382.015(2) (2018) (“Upon receipt of the report,
a certiﬁed copy of a ﬁnal decree of determination of paternity . . . together with suﬃcient
information to identify the original certiﬁcate of live birth, the department shall prepare and ﬁle a
new birth certiﬁcate.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46, § 13(a)(5) (2018) (requiring the state registrar
to issue an amended birth certiﬁcate upon receipt of a “certiﬁed copy of such judgment” of
paternity by a court or administrative agency); see also Berwick v. Wagner, 336 S.W.3d 805, 809
(Tex. App. 2011) (recognizing as a valid child-custody determination an out-of-state judgment
naming two male same-sex partners as parents of a child born to a surrogate).
123 See Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 789 n.17 (Conn. 2011) (“The birth certiﬁcate must
accurately reﬂect the legal relationship between parent and child, but it does not create that
relationship.”); In re T.J.S., 16 A.3d 386, 390 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (“A birth certiﬁcate
simply records the fact of parentage as reported by others; it neither constitutes a legal ﬁnding of
parentage nor independently creates or terminates parental rights.”).
124 Carlos A. Ball, The Immorality of Statutory Restrictions on Adoption by Lesbians and Gay Men,
38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 379, 393 n.80 (2007).
125 The signiﬁcance of the information contained within birth certiﬁcates has also been
recognized federally. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
OEI-07-99-00570, BIRTH CERTIFICATE FRAUD 6 (2000) (noting that although birth certiﬁcates
were originally only intended to certify the documentation of a birth, they now serve a myriad of
purposes, including “assist[ing] in determining eligibility for public assistance and other beneﬁts”
and “enroll[ing] children in school”).
126 See e.g., Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077 (2017) (“According to the court below, however,
Arkansas need not . . . issue birth certificates including the female spouses of women who give birth
in the State.”); Henderson v. Adams, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1066 (S.D. Ind. 2016) (noting that “[t]he
non-birth mothers seek to be listed on their child’s birth certificate” in joint cases of female, same-sex
married couples in Indiana); Roe v. Patton, No. 2:15-00253, 2015 WL 4476734, at *2 (D. Utah July 22,
2015) (“Defendants refuse to recognize Angie as a legal parent of L.R. or identify her as a parent on
L.R.’s birth certificate unless Angie adopts L.R. through a step-parent adoption.”).
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conclusion of a formal legal process, such as adoption, memorializing the
legal status of the partners.127
Just as the “States have contributed to the fundamental character of the
marriage right by placing that institution at the center of so many facets of
the legal and social order,” the various statutory entitlements that derive from
designation as a parent on the birth certificate underscore the significance of
the document as reflected in the expression of legislatures across the United
States.128 The societally recognized importance of information listed on the
birth certificate is not limited to the parties designated as parents; indeed,
various other details contained within the birth certificate have been
recognized interstate with varying degrees of deference.
First, the accuracy of the date of birth contained in the birth certificate is an
item of importance that has been a central issue in a variety of cases. In Bennett
v. Schweiker,129 a case involving a claim for retirement insurance benefits, the
court recognized that full faith and credit was owed to the out-of-state birth
certificate, which corrected the date of the claimant’s birth.130 The conclusion
that full faith and credit applied to the vital details in the birth certificate was
apparently straightforward, as the court provided little explanation for why
there was an “obligation” to entitle the out-of-state birth certificate to full faith
and credit.131 Similarly, in Tindle v. Celebrezze,132 for the purpose of determining
entitlement to Social Security benefits, full faith and credit recognition was
granted to the date of birth in an out-of-state birth certificate, though the court
noted that the birth certificate was only entitled to the weight that the
enforcing forum would give it, that is, prima facie weight.133 Age as listed in the
birth certificate can also be significant in the criminal context, where

127 See e.g., Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[T]wo unmarried individuals
. . . legally adopted Louisiana-born Infant J in New York . . . [and] sought to have Infant J’s birth
certiﬁcate reissued in Louisiana supplanting the names of his biological parents with their own.”);
Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that the resolution of the case
turned on the validity of “a state statute providing for categorical non-recognition of a class of
adoption decrees from other states, denying the ‘eﬀective operation’ of out-of-state adoption
proceedings”); Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 611 S.E.2d 366, 372 (Va. 2005) (holding that the
applicable state statute “require[d] that the Registrar issue a new certiﬁcate of birth”).
128 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015).
129 543 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C. 1982).
130 Id. at 898.
131 See id. (“Under section 1739 . . . the Secretary is obligated to give full faith and credit to
the . . . correction [reﬂected in the out-of-state] birth certiﬁcate.”).
132 210 F. Supp. 912 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
133 Id. at 915; see also Kappler v. Shalala, 840 F. Supp. 582, 587 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (rejecting, ultimately,
the full faith and credit argument, because “‘full faith and credit’ is shorthand for the same credit that
such a document is given under [forum state] law—and that merely means prima facie evidence”).
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determining whether a defendant will be tried as a juvenile or an adult may
hinge on age calculated from the birth certificate date of birth.134
Second, the proper status of gender identiﬁcation as listed in the birth
certiﬁcate has received increasing attention in recent years. For example, in
In re Estate of Gardiner,135 the Kansas Supreme Court refused to recognize
the updated gender of a male-to-female transgender individual as reﬂected
in her revised out-of-state birth certiﬁcate because under forum law she
remained a male, and therefore her marriage with her husband was void.136
This holding attracted negative attention from media and criticism from
academic commentators.137 It represents another way in which the lack of
guidance on how the full faith and credit mandate applies to “records”
creates signiﬁcant problems and should be resolved in favor of ensuring
continuity in the expectations of the aﬀected individual.
In summary, society imbues various details in birth certiﬁcates with
great signiﬁcance. Parental designation in the birth certiﬁcate is especially
important, as reﬂected by the centrality of this document in completing
school registration, securing entitlements, and eﬀectuating various other
activities. The fact that the birth certiﬁcate is treated as a critical indicator
of parentage is strong support for treating it as a “record” under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause because this would provide a meaningful solution
to the recognition problem faced by same-sex couples.
B. Judicial Identification of the Importance in Providing Stability
In its full faith and credit jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
recognized the importance of providing stability and predictability to the
validity of legal status because this enables individuals to organize their
personal and professional endeavors with assurance that their status will not
be questioned when travelling interstate. The value in providing certainty to
legal status is especially signiﬁcant in the context of family law, where the
psychological and physical safety of a child depends, in large part, on the
security of his or her family unit.
In Williams v. North Carolina,138 the Supreme Court considered whether a
North Carolina couple who fell in love and travelled to Las Vegas to obtain
divorces from their respective spouses was entitled to recognition of the
134 See Prum, supra note 102, at 169 (summarizing a case where date of birth as reﬂected in
the birth certiﬁcate played a role in determination of criminal liability).
135 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
136 Id. at 137.
137 See Gebhardt, supra note 101, at 1421 (summarizing overwhelmingly negative response to
Gardiner holding).
138 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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Nevada divorce decrees as a defense to North Carolina’s prosecution for
bigamy.139 The Court answered the question affirmatively, emphasizing the
“intensely practical considerations” that supported recognizing, under full
faith and credit principles, the legitimacy of the Nevada divorce decree.140
The argument that entitling the out-of-state divorce decree would allow “one
state’s policy of strict control over the institution of marriage [to] be thwarted
by the decree of a more lax state” was emphatically rejected because that
“objection goes to the application of the full faith and credit clause to many
situations.”141 Finally, the “considerable interests involved and the substantial
and far-reaching effects” that failure to ensure interstate recognition would
have indicated that full faith and credit was owed to the divorce decree.142
The Williams decision is instructive to the proper treatment of birth
certiﬁcates for a number of reasons. First, Williams highlighted various
practical considerations, including the interest in discouraging polygamous
marriages and in protecting children of lawful marriages, that were served
by recognizing the divorce decree. Analogous “intensely practical
considerations”143 exist in the family law context, where there is an interest
in ensuring the legitimacy of a functional same-sex parent because this
discourages forum shopping in the event of dissolution of the relationship
and ensures stability for the child.
Second, the Williams court indisputably rejected the objection to full
faith and credit recognition for divorce decrees based on the potential for
the laws of a more permissive state to be invoked in a stricter state.144 The
analogue in the parentage context is the potential for a state with a
restrictive family law regime that does not recognize the parental status of a
same-sex couple nonetheless being forced to recognize the parental status of
the couple due to the fact that they enjoy this status in a more permissive
state;145 Williams indicates that this critique lacks merit.
Third, Williams specifically highlighted the special importance of providing
definiteness to status determinations as a factor to be weighed in the full faith
and credit calculus. In the absence of the finality guarantee of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, an anomalous result would obtain: different states could
seemingly pronounce on the status of an individual in contradictory ways. An
Id. at 289-90.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 303-04.
Id. at 301.
See id. at 302 (“Such is part of the price of our federal system.”).
This argument was made by the biological parent seeking to cut oﬀ parental rights of her
former same-sex partner in Miller-Jenkins, although it was ultimately rejected by the court. MillerJenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 337 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
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equally illogical result obtains if parental status as reflected in a birth certificate
is not entitled to full faith and credit recognition: a lawful parent in one
jurisdiction could be denied this status in others, leading to a denial of parental
rights and privileges that turns on physical location.
Though the animating purpose of the need for certainty highlighted in
Williams was in relation to the judicial proceedings category of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, the concern for ensuring predictability also applies
in the context of records and supports entitling birth certiﬁcates to full faith
and credit deference.
The significance of this concern is underscored by the long history of
hostility to same-sex couples, evidenced most prominently in the context of
marriage. Until the Supreme Court’s establishment of a constitutional
fundamental right to marry for same-sex couples in Obergefell, many states not
only prohibited the marriage of same-sex couples, but also refused to
recognize otherwise valid out-of-state same-sex marriages.146 The overt
hostility evidenced by the numerous states that enacted legislation or
amended their state constitutions to exclude same-sex marriages from the
general interstate recognition principle applied to marriage147 was exemplified
at the federal level as well. In conjunction with the Defense of Marriage Act,
Congress amended the Full Faith and Credit Act to bestow discretion on the
individual states to decide whether to recognize otherwise valid same-sex
marriages that were performed out of state.148 That both state and federal
governments explicitly carved out same-sex marriage from recognition across
state lines prior to subsequent Supreme Court invalidation of such laws only
serves to highlight the importance of providing predictability, as emphasized
by the Williams court, in an otherwise tenuous area.

146 See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (“No oﬃcial or court of the state of Louisiana shall
recognize any marriage contracted in any other jurisdiction which is not the union of one man and
one woman.”), held unconstitutional by Robicheaux v. Caldwell, No. 13-5090, 2015 WL 4090353
(E.D. La. July 2, 2015); ALA. CODE § 30-1-19(e) (2018) (“The State of Alabama shall not recognize
as valid any marriage of parties of the same sex that occurred . . . as a result of the law of any
jurisdiction regardless of whether a marriage license was issued.”), held unconstitutional by Strawser
v. Strange, 105 F. Supp. 3d 1323 (S.D. Ala. 2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208(a)(2) (2018) (“Any
marriage entered into by a person of the same sex, when a marriage license is issued by another
state or by a foreign jurisdiction, shall be void . . . and any contractual or other rights granted by
virtue of that license . . . shall be unenforceable in the Arkansas courts.”), held unconstitutional in
part by Jernigan v. Crane, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1260 (E.D. Ark. 2014).
147 The common law place-of-celebration rule provides that a marriage validly entered into under
the laws of one state will be respected in all other states. See infra text accompanying notes 172–73.
148 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012) (providing that “[n]o State . . . shall be required to give
eﬀect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State . . . [establishing a
marriage] between persons of the same sex”).
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C. Congressional Recognition of the Heightened Significance in Providing
Certainty in Family Law
The necessity of providing assurance to actors in the family law context
has also been recognized by Congress, as exemplified by the enactment of the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)149 and the Full Faith and Credit
for Child Support Orders Act (FFCCSOA).150 Through these statutes,
Congress has ensured that child custody and support orders are respected
nationwide. The interest in providing determinacy and certainty, identified as
a motivating purpose behind the PKPA and FFCCSOA, applies equally to
protecting the parentage of same-sex couples and thus supports entitling birth
certificates to full faith and credit recognition as “records.”151
Various policy arguments regarding the need for full faith and credit
assurances were emphasized in the enactment of the PKPA. In particular,
the interest in providing “greater stability of home environment and . . .
secure family relationships for the child” was identiﬁed as a consideration
motivating the Act’s passage.152 Congressional sensitivity to the problems
that lack of recognition of familial status creates for children supports
treating the birth certiﬁcate as a “record” for full faith and credit purposes
because this treatment would help to ensure the continued stability and
sanctity of the home. The explicit concern for providing certainty applies
equally to the need for assurances of ﬁnality as to the legitimacy of the
status of the parents listed on a child’s birth certiﬁcate. Therefore, treating
birth certiﬁcates as “records” under the Full Faith and Credit Clause would
further the purpose identiﬁed by the drafters of the PKPA.
Moreover, Congress’s identification of uncertainty in the determination of
custody as a problem and its provision of a solution to that problem in the form
of the PKPA indicate that the family law context is different. The uniquely
intimate nature of the family law area justifies a higher level of deference to
28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2012).
28 U.S.C. § 1738B (2012).
The fact that Congress has exercised its constitutional full faith and credit enforcement
power to ensure interstate recognition of custody and support orders raises the question of
whether congressional legislation mandating nationwide recognition of birth certiﬁcates is a more
appropriate eﬀectuation mechanism. In all three of the narrow instances in which Congress,
relying on its eﬀects power, enacted statutes pertaining to domestic law, the action “was
necessitated by the failure of sister state courts to give full faith and credit to orders not regarded
as ﬁnal judgments.” CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31201, FAMILY LAW: CONGRESS’S AUTHORITY
TO LEGISLATE DOMESTIC RELATIONS QUESTIONS 22 (2012). That motivation applies equally to
birth certiﬁcates since they are similarly modiﬁable and indicates that federal legislation
guaranteeing interstate recognition of birth certiﬁcates is another way to implement this solution.
However, given the historical limitations on Congress’s power to legislate in the domestic relations
area, this Comment focuses on judicial implementation.
152 Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 7(c)(4), 94 Stat. 3566, 3569 (1980).
149
150
151
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birth certificates because this would provide a greater level of certainty to samesex parents, and by extension, their children. Congress’s expression of its desire
to provide determinacy to the legal validity of parental status corroborates the
feasibility of entitling birth certificates to full faith and credit recognition
because this solution serves as another way to ensure certainty of parentage.
Although the deﬁnition of “custody determination” in the PKPA does
not, by its terms, include birth certiﬁcates, this is not fatal to the analysis.
Taken in context with the societal importance attached to birth certiﬁcates
and the judicially acknowledged signiﬁcance of providing predictability to
status determinations, the fact that Congress has clearly expressed its intent
to provide certainty to actors in the family law context is notable. This
unambiguous intent supports treating birth certiﬁcates as “records” under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
D. Principles Underlying Recent Supreme Court Family Law Decisions
That birth certificates are properly entitled to full faith and credit recognition
is supported by recent Supreme Court pronouncements in Obergefell and Pavan,
both decisions made within the context of same-sex marriage and parentage.
First, in Obergefell, the Supreme Court addressed the lack of uniformity
of state policy on the legality of same-sex marriage, solving this “severe
hardship” by designating the right to marry as a fundamental constitutional
right that cannot be abridged.153 Reasoning under Fourteenth Amendment
due process and equal protection guarantees, the Obergefell court identified
four premises in support of their holding. Relevant to the context of samesex parentage, the court emphasized the importance of affording same-sex
parents the same rights and protections that are extended to opposite-sex
parents. In particular, the court noted that the failure to do so caused
disruption to the “hundreds of thousands of children” being raised in samesex families, causing them to experience undeserved “harm and
humiliat[ion].”154 Relatedly, the Obergefell court repudiated the symbolic
harm inflicted on same-sex couples that was caused by exclusion from the
revered institution of marriage, concluding that it “impose[d] stigma and
injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter.”155 Finally, the court
explicated various rights within the “constellation of benefits” to which
same-sex couples are entitled, specifically listing birth certificates as one such
benefit.156 The broad phraseology used throughout the opinion indicates that
the Court intended for its holding to protect more than just the singular
153
154
155
156

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
Id. at 2600-01.
Id. at 2602.
Id.
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institution of same-sex marriage; this is confirmed by the fact that two of the
Obergefell plaintiffs were challenging a state law that permitted opposite-sex,
but not same-sex, couples to both serve as adoptive parents to the same
child.157 The interpretation of Obergefell as protecting not only the right to
marry, but also the benefits and privileges that are intertwined with
marriage, was subsequently confirmed in Pavan v. Smith.
In Pavan, the Supreme Court made clear that where a jurisdiction recognizes
the parental status of a nonbiological parent of a child conceived to her marital
partner through artificial insemination, the state must list both members of the
married same-sex couple on the birth certificate, just as they would list both
members of the married opposite-sex couple as parents on the birth certificate.158
Pavan involved a state Department of Health official who refused to list both
partners of a same-sex couple on a birth certificate when they conceived a child
through anonymous sperm donation, instead issuing a certificate that bore only
the birth mother’s name. Highlighting Obergefell’s explicit identification of the
birth certificate as one of the “rights, benefits, and responsibilities” to which
same-sex couples are entitled, the Supreme Court summarily reversed the state
supreme court’s affirmation of the Department’s action.159 Commentators were
encouraged by the fact that the opinion was issued per curiam, interpreting this
as a sign that the “court emphatically declared that the rules about children must
be applied equally to same-sex spouses.”160
A question left open after Pavan is whether a state that treats the birth
certificate as a mere record of biological parentage (i.e., a state that does not
permit the husband of a woman who conceives through artificial insemination
to be listed as father) would be able to deny a same-sex parent the right to be
listed on the birth certificate of her spouse’s child. Indeed, pre-Pavan, the Court
of Appeals of Oregon noted the distinction between a traditional marital
presumption and a marital presumption that explicitly rejects biological reality
in holding that Oregon’s artificial insemination statute, making a mother’s
consenting husband the parent of her child, must be extended to same-sex
couples; however, the court affirmed that limiting the traditional marital
presumption to opposite-sex couples was acceptable because the key difference
between the two scenarios was the “possibility of a biological relationship.”161
The likelihood of success for a state that seeks to justify its birth
certiﬁcate law on this ground, as the state of Arkansas (unsuccessfully) did
Id. at 2595.
Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017).
Id.
Mark Walsh, Court Rules on Birth Certificate Designations for Same-Sex Parents, A.B.A. J. (Sept.
2017),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/supreme_court_birth_certificate_designations
[https://perma.cc/G6SM-4GHJ].
161 Shineovich v. Kemp, 214 P.3d 29, 39 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
157
158
159
160
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in Pavan,162 is unclear. The Pavan court emphasized Arkansas’s artiﬁcial
insemination rule heavily in reaching their ultimate holding,163 but the brief
opinion also cites generally to “disparate treatment” proscribed by Obergefell
in support of its conclusion.164 Such language perhaps indicates that Pavan
guarantees more than simple equality between same- and opposite-sex
couples with respect to birth certiﬁcate inclusion. Additionally, a state
seeking to justify its birth certiﬁcate law on this theory would have to
contend with the possibility that even where it is biologically viable for the
child to be the oﬀspring of the mother’s husband, the child still could have
been conceived as a result of an extramarital aﬀair, in which case the state’s
asserted interest in maintaining accurate genetic records would not be
served. Finally, concerns about Pavan’s reach to a same-sex couple where the
state would not list the nonbiological parent of a diﬀerent sex on the birth
certiﬁcate are largely negated by the fact that the vast majority of states take
Arkansas’s approach of using the birth certiﬁcate as a marker of not just
biology-based parentage, but of functional parentage as well.165
The landmark holdings of Obergefell and Pavan, and the premises underlying
the decisions, are instructive in the parentage context and indicate that birth
certificates should be entitled to conclusive weight. First, the sweeping language
of Obergefell leaves no room for doubt that, as a constitutional matter, same-sex
parents must be afforded rights on the same basis as opposite-sex parents.166
Therefore, if a nonbiological parent in an opposite-sex partnership is treated as a
parent, there is no constitutional basis for denying that same status to a
nonbiological parent in a same-sex partnership—a conclusion that Pavan affirms.
If the animating principle is that same-sex partners must be afforded the same
rights as those that are extended to opposite-sex couples, it is clear that the
parentage of same-sex parents as reflected in a birth certificate must be
recognized in other states. Because the opposite-sex nonbiological parent listed
on his child’s birth certificate would be presumed a parent in other states, so too
must the same-sex nonbiological parent listed as such on her child’s birth
certificate be respected as a parent in other states. This is clear support for the
Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078.
See id. at 2078-79 (“The State uses [birth] certiﬁcates to give married parents a form of
legal recognition that is not available to unmarried parents. Having made that choice, Arkansas
may not, consistent with Obergefell, deny married same-sex couples that recognition.”).
164 Id. at 2078.
165 See supra notes 12–13, 26 (collecting and discussing states that provide for the marital
partner of a woman who conceives a child through artiﬁcial insemination to be listed as a parent
on the child’s birth certiﬁcate).
166 See, e.g., Chaisson v. State, 239 So. 3d 1074, 1081 (La. Ct. App. 2018) (reasoning that
because Obergefell requires the state to “provide equal protection to same sex couples seeking to
amend a birth certiﬁcate,” the biological mother could not invoke her former partner’s lack of a
biological connection to justify eﬀorts to remove the nonbiological parent from the certiﬁcate).
162
163
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conclusion that entitling birth certificates to full faith and credit recognition
would be one meaningful solution to the uncertainty that same-sex parents may
face in establishing their parentage.
Second, Obergefell’s explicit identiﬁcation of the harm caused to children
by excluding same-sex couples from the institution of marriage as one of
four factors relevant to the decision translates to the context of same-sex
parentage. Just as the failure to recognize the legal validity of same-sex
marriage causes children of same-sex parents to "suﬀer the stigma of
knowing their families are somehow lesser," the failure to provide certainty
to the parentage of same-sex parents implicates a similar destabilization.167
Through no fault of their own, these children may face challenges in
registering for school, sports, and various other activities simply as a result
of the sexual orientation of their parents. Such a result is incompatible with
Obergefell’s desire to mitigate against the hardship faced by children of samesex couples and supports the conclusion that parentage as reﬂected in a
birth certiﬁcate should be respected across the country. The importance of
ensuring stability is ampliﬁed in the context of family relationships because
of the need to protect children. Treating birth certiﬁcates as full faith and
credit records represents one way in which the security of parental
relationships could be meaningfully protected. Moreover, this solution can
be implemented seamlessly with minimal expense.
Third, the Pavan court recognized that the birth certiﬁcate is more than
“simply a device for recording biological parentage.”168 The birth certiﬁcate
has evolved from a mere medical record into a symbolic embodiment of
parentage, and this beneﬁt must be extended equally to same-sex couples.
Emphasizing the societal importance attached to the document is in accord
with the great signiﬁcance that the birth certiﬁcate carries as reﬂected in the
norms and practices of various institutions, including schools and state
agencies.169 This provides additional support for entitling birth certiﬁcates
to conclusive interstate recognition because as noted by the Pavan court, the
birth certiﬁcate has evolved into a document signifying far more than
biological status, and therefore it is one of the many facets of the parentchild relationship to which same-sex couples must have equal access if the
Obergefell mandate is to be fulﬁlled.
In summary, the doctrinal underpinnings of the Obergefell and Pavan
decisions support the feasibility of entitling birth certificates, and the parentage
of the parties as reflected within them, to full faith and credit recognition.
167 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015) (citing United States v. Windsor, 570
U.S. 744, 772 (2013)).
168 Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078.
169 See supra Section III.A.

2019]

The Birth Certificate Solution

1013

E. Other State-Issued Records Entitled to Interstate Recognition
Birth certificates are one of the most important state-issued records, as
they establish critical information about an individual’s identity, background,
and biology. Other state-issued records, in particular drivers’ licenses and
marriage certificates, also play significant roles in their respective realms. A
review of the treatment of these records is instructive to the feasibility of
entitling birth certificates to full faith and credit protection as a means of
solving the recognition problem for same-sex couples.
First, the driver’s license is the paradigmatic example of a document that
is used regularly out of state and is undeniably entitled to interstate
recognition. The driver’s license is used to signify successful completion of a
driving test and establish an individual’s right to operate a vehicle on the
public roadways. It also contains various personal characteristics, including
an individual’s age and home address, and is used to prove identity at
airports,170 voting polls,171 and when opening a bank account.172 Recognizing
the diﬃculties that could arise if states refused to recognize foreign drivers’
licenses, an interstate agreement, the Driver License Compact (DLC), was
enacted in the 1960s. Forty-six states and the District of Columbia are
signatories to the DLC, which requires states to exchange information
relating to license suspensions and to forward violations to the state where
the individual is licensed.173
Second, the marriage certiﬁcate is a document that is commonly used
for interstate purposes and generally entitled to extraterritorial
recognition174 under the place of celebration, or lex celebrationis, rule.175 The
170 See, e.g., Identification, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/travel/securityscreening/identiﬁcation [https://perma.cc/AT9G-VZSY] (listing a driver’s license as a valid form
of required identiﬁcation for adult passengers over eighteen at airport checkpoints).
171 See, e.g., PA. DEP’T STATE, VOTER IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS (2015),
http://www.dos.pa.gov/VotingElections/OtherServicesEvents/Documents/Voter%20ID%20Guida
nce%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/79ZF-P9YR] (listing a state-issued drivers license as a way
to establish identity).
172 See,
e.g.,
Opening
Your
First
Bank
Accounts,
WELLS
FARGO,
https://www.wellsfargo.com/goals-going-to-college/ﬁrst-account/ [https://perma.cc/QJ2X-LZAT]
(noting that to open a basic checking account, the customer must present a driver’s license).
173 Driver
License
Compact,
NAT’L CTR. FOR INTERSTATE COMPACTS,
http://apps.csg.org/ncic/Compact.aspx?id=56 [https://perma.cc/H96G-55ML].
174 The notable exception to this generalization is same-sex marriage, which was explicitly
carved out from interstate recognition by the elected representatives (through legislation) and voters
(through constitutional amendment) of numerous states. See supra notes 146–148 and accompanying
text. Thus, the place of celebration rule serves two analytical purposes in supporting the argument of
this Comment: First, hostile state action excluding same-sex marriage from the place of celebration
principle underscores the importance of providing certainty to couples who have historically been
discriminated against. Second, the longstanding precedent of treating a marriage certificate, though
not an order resulting from a judicial proceeding, as entitled to interstate recognition shows that
documents of societal significance are treated differently for important policy reasons.
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place of celebration principle developed to resolve conﬂicts resulting from a
diﬀerence in how a union would be treated under the diverging laws of two
jurisdictions.176 According to this rule, a marriage that is valid where it is
celebrated is valid everywhere.177 Two exceptions to the place of celebration
doctrine developed: Under the natural law exception, a state could refuse to
recognize a marriage if it would be considered universally objectionable.
Relatedly, under the positive law exception, a state could refuse to recognize
a marriage if its legislature had speciﬁcally provided that marriages of that
type should not be given interstate eﬀect.178 Notwithstanding the leeway for
recognition refusal enabled by the natural law and positive law exceptions,
states generally continue to favor recognition for four reasons: providing
predictability and stability to families, promoting marital responsibility,
facilitating interstate travel, and protecting expectations of privacy.179
The extent to which other state-issued records, particularly driver’s
licenses and marriage certificates, are entitled to interstate recognition
supports giving the parentage details contained in the birth certificate full
faith and credit deference. Just as the driver’s license establishes critical
identity facts, the individuals listed as “parents” in a child’s birth certificate
represent a crucial personal characteristic. However, in contrast to a driver’s

175 Generally, interstate recognition of a marriage certiﬁcate is tied to the place of celebration
principle, not the full faith and credit mandate. FAMILY LAW: CONGRESS’S AUTHORITY TO
LEGISLATE DOMESTIC RELATIONS QUESTIONS, supra note 151, at 19 (noting that the “Full Faith
and Credit Clause has rarely been used by courts to validate marriages” and therefore describing
how the place of celebration rule is generally used to validate marriages).
176 Until the Obergefell decision mooted the question, there was considerable debate about
whether states that did not recognize same-sex marriage were nonetheless obligated to recognize
the validity of such marriages if they were completed legitimately in another jurisdiction that
recognized marriage between two persons of the same sex. The place of celebration rule was one of
the ways in which this question was answered.
177 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1971)
(“[A] marriage which satisﬁes the requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will
everywhere be recognized as valid . . . .”).
178 If a state is hostile to same-sex parentage, perhaps by not providing for an artiﬁcial
insemination marital presumption rule, then an analogue of the natural law exception could
arguably be used by the state to refuse to honor the parentage of a same-sex couple as reﬂected in
the birth certiﬁcate. However, invocation of this exception necessitates clearing a high bar: the
positive law exception cannot be used by “courts . . . to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the
pleasure of the judges.” Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918).
Rather, refusal to apply the place of celebration rule under the positive law exception must be
based on “some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some
deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.” Id. Given the intimacy of parentage and the
constitutional rights implicated thereby, it is doubtful that a state’s justiﬁcation for refusing to
recognize the status of a same-sex parent would rise to this level.
179 Joanna L. Grossman, Interstate Marriage Recognition: When History Meets the Supreme Court,
VERDICT (Apr. 28, 2015), https://verdict.justia.com/2015/04/28/interstate-marriage-recognitionwhen-history-meets-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/25BV-9FRE].
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license, the nature of the birth certificate does not require cross-state
cooperation to ensure the tracking of illegal activity in order to protect the
safety of road travelers. Birth certificates are used for ordinary tasks such as
school registration and benefits eligibility, and though the possibility for
birth certificate fraud is well documented, the fraud is not tied to the
identity of the persons listed as parents.180 Therefore, there is little need for
an interstate compact committed to cooperation in enforcement; certainty
for same-sex parents can be achieved by simply recognizing the validity of
the parents listed on the out-of-state birth certificate in the first instance.
Similar to marriage, where the claim for recognition is strong because of
the societal signiﬁcance attached to the institution and the beneﬁts and
privileges that ﬂow from it, parental designation in the birth certiﬁcate
analogously provides for the exercise of rights crucial to fulﬁlling the
parental function. Just as the importance of providing for familial stability
and supporting interstate travel were identiﬁed as signiﬁcant factors in
marriage recognition cases, those priorities equally militate in favor of
providing predictability and certainty to same-sex parenthood, thus
supporting entitling birth certiﬁcates to full faith and credit deference.
In summary, interstate recognition of other state-issued records, namely
drivers’ licenses and marriage certiﬁcates, demonstrates the feasibility of the
birth certiﬁcate solution to the recognition problem encountered by samesex parents. Although recognition of these documents is not necessarily
based on the full faith and credit mandate, commentators have argued for
the provision of interstate recognition for state-issued records based on the
Full Faith and Credit Clause.181 For purposes of this Comment, it is
signiﬁcant that various other state-issued records are entitled to recognition
between the states and that the full faith and credit argument is not
unprecedented in this context.

180 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OAI-86-0200001, BIRTH CERTIFICATE FRAUD 3 (1988) (noting that birth certiﬁcate fraud primarily involves
the use of the document in identity theft).
181 For example, in the debate over the portability of a license to carry a ﬁrearm, several
academics urged Congress to amend the Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2017 to rest on the
full faith and credit mandate, rather than the commerce power, because congressional power under
the Full Faith and Credit Eﬀects Clause was a more doctrinally tenable justiﬁcation for the Act.
See Letter from Stephen E. Sachs, Professor, Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, et al., to Trey Gowdy,
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec. & Investigations, et al., (Mar. 23, 2017),
http://www.stevesachs.com/HR38_SachsBarnettBaudeLtr_20170323.pdf [https://perma.cc/864KJM7R].
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F. Judicially Developed Limitations and the Practicality
of the Birth Certificate Solution
Two judicially developed limitations, the lack of finality limitation and the
distinction between recognition versus enforcement, do not undermine the
feasibility of the birth certificate solution. First, the modifiable nature of birth
certificates (and the lack of finality that this implicates) is not fatal because
Congress has expressly indicated its intent to protect custody and support
orders interstate, even though these orders are inherently flexible based on
changes in circumstances. Second, the recognition–enforcement distinction
does not unduly frustrate the birth certificate solution because it is only relevant
when a third party seeks to rebut the parental status of the nonbiological parent,
and the circumstances in which rebuttal is permitted are limited.
1. Lack of Finality Limitation
Even assuming that birth certificates are “records” under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause entitled to deference, the extent to which they provide
meaningful relief to the uncertainty faced by same-sex parents requires
confronting the lack of finality limitation. Although the text of the Clause does
not require finality as a prerequisite for application, many are of the opinion
that lack of finality is fatal to a determination that full faith and credit
recognition is owed,182 though this opinion is far from settled.183 The strength
of the finality requirement is critical in the context of decisions made under
family law because in the vast majority of jurisdictions, judgments concerning
custody and support are modifiable. By definition, a judgment subject to
modification is not final, theoretically supporting the position that birth
certificates are not final within the scope of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.184

182 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 107 (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (“A
judgment will not be recognized or enforced in other states insofar as it is not a ﬁnal
determination under the local law of the state of rendition.”); William L. Reynolds, The Iron Law
of Full Faith and Credit, 53 MD. L. REV. 412, 419 (1994) (“A judgment that is not ﬁnal under the
law of the state in which it was rendered is not entitled to full faith and credit.”).
183 See, e.g., Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 87 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Neither the
full faith and credit clause . . . nor the Act of Congress implementing it says anything about ﬁnal
judgments . . . . Both require that full faith and credit be given to ‘judicial proceedings’ without
limitation as to ﬁnality.”).
184 See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 180 (1988) (suggesting that the confusion over
the level of deference owed to custody orders derived from their modifiable nature, prompting the
need for legislation in the form of the PKPA); Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 26 (1910) (holding that an
alimony payment determined by the continuing discretion of the rendering court was modifiable and
therefore not entitled to full faith and credit); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 109(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (“A judgment rendered in one State . . . need not be recognized
or enforced in a sister State insofar as the judgment remains subject to modification . . . .”).
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Birth certificates implicate the lack of finality facet of the full faith and credit
doctrine because they are modifiable, and thus not “final.” Listed attributes such
as name and sex are modifiable by the owner of the certificate upon compliance
with various statutory requirements,185 and significantly, parentage can also be
updated if an adoption is successfully completed or if another type of judgment
establishing legal parenthood is granted, where available.186
However, in legislating pursuant to the Eﬀects Clause, Congress has
explicitly ensured that child custody and support determinations are
entitled to full faith and credit recognition, notwithstanding the lack of
ﬁnality. The legislative history of the PKPA in both the House of
Representatives187 and the Senate188 indicates that concern for the lack of
ﬁnality in custody orders, rather than being a reason not to treat these
records as entitled to full faith and credit, was instead one of the
considerations that animated the passage of the Act. In particular, records of
the congressional debates noted that though the Full Faith and Credit
Clause traditionally did not apply where the order was not ﬁnal, this factor
supported, rather than undermined, the propriety of legislation imposing a
binding mandate to ensure interstate recognition of orders pertaining to
custody and support.189 The policy arguments made in the PKPA debates
about the need for full faith and credit assurances in the family law context,
despite the fact that child custody orders are modiﬁable under the best
interests standard, apply equally to the need for assurances of ﬁnality as to
the parents listed on a child’s birth certiﬁcate and support entitling birth
certiﬁcates to full faith and credit deference.
Additionally, the term “custody determination” as deﬁned by the PKPA,
though not by its terms including birth certiﬁcates, explicitly rejects the
modiﬁable objection by explicitly including “temporary orders, and initial
orders and modifications” within its scope.190 Therefore, to the extent that
lack of ﬁnality is problematic, the modiﬁable nature of birth certiﬁcates
should not raise this concern because in the family law context, Congress
has expressed its intent to aﬀord custody and support orders full faith and
credit protection, notwithstanding the potential for modiﬁcation.

Annette R. Appell, Certifying Identity, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 361, 377 (2014).
See supra note 122 (listing states that provide for issuance of a supplemental birth
certiﬁcate when an adoption is procured).
187 H.R. REP. NO. 103-206, at 4-5 (1993).
188 S. REP. NO. 103-361, at 4 (1994).
189 See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 177 (noting that one of the purposes underlying Congress’s
enactment of the PKPA was discouraging “jurisdictional competition and conﬂict between State
courts”); see also FAMILY LAW: CONGRESS’S AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATE DOMESTIC
RELATIONS QUESTIONS, supra note 151, at 22.
190 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2012) (emphasis added).
185
186
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2. Circuit Split on Recognition Versus Enforcement Distinction
Entitling birth certificates to full faith and credit deference does not
implicate the circuit split on the distinction between recognition and
enforcement of an out-of-state judgment. The question of whether same-sex
adoptive parents are entitled to a supplemental birth certificate listing them as
such pursuant to a valid out-of-state adoption decree has prompted
contradictory answers. The disagreement draws on the distinction between
recognition and enforcement of an out-of-state judgment. Though relevant, this
distinction does not impact the viability of entitling full faith and credit
protection to birth certificates to conclusively protect the parentage of samesex parents because the circumstances in which rebuttal of the marital
presumption is allowed are narrow.
The distinction between recognition and enforcement of an out-of-state
judgment was developed by a pair of cases from two Courts of Appeals: the
Fifth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit.191 Both cases turned on the level of
deference owed to a valid out-of-state adoption decree obtained by a same-sex
couple for purposes of entitlement to a supplemental birth certificate. Finstuen v.
Crutcher192 invalidated the refusal of a state health department to issue a new
birth certificate to same-sex adoptive parents with a valid out-of-state adoption
decree for their child.193 Under the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the full faith
and credit mandate, because the state had chosen to provide for the issuance of
supplementary birth certificates for adopted children, it was required to apply
this in an “‘even-handed’ manner” to same-sex couples.194 The Fifth Circuit
reached the opposite conclusion in Adar v. Smith,195 holding that because the
state did not provide for issuance of a revised birth certificate when the adoptive
parents were unmarried, there was no enforcement mechanism available to
support requiring the Registrar to issue the supplemental birth certificate.196

191 For a more thorough discussion of the criticism of the circuit split, particularly the
distinction drawn by the Fifth Circuit, see Karel Raba, Note, Recognition and Enforcement of Out-ofState Adoption Decrees Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause: The Case of Supplemental Birth
Certificates, 15 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON RACE & SOC. JUST. 293, 304 (2013). See also
Joseph A. Fraioli, Note, Having Faith in Full Faith & Credit: Finstuen, Adar, and the Quest for
Interstate Same-Sex Parental Recognition, 98 IOWA L. REV. 365, 368 (2012) (urging the Supreme
Court to “embrac[e] the full-faith-and-credit analysis the Tenth Circuit articulated in Finstuen”);
Elizabeth Redpath, Comment, Between Judgment and Law: Full Faith and Credit, Public Policy, and
State Records, 62 EMORY L.J. 639, 679-80 (2013) (concluding that “full faith and credit requires
[recognition], but not [enforcement of an out-of-state record]”).
192 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007).
193 Id. at 1156.
194 Id. at 1154 (citing Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 235 (1998)).
195 639 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. 2011).
196 Id. at 161.
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In both Finstuen and Adar, the request for new birth certiﬁcates was
based on parentage as reﬂected in validly issued adoption decrees, making
both cases factually distinguishable from the scenario envisioned by this
Comment, where a same-sex couple simply wishes to protect the validity of
their parentage as reﬂected in an out-of-state birth certiﬁcate. Nonetheless,
extrapolating from the principles enunciated by the Fifth and Tenth
Circuits indicates that the recognition–enforcement distinction does not
undermine the feasibility of solving the parentage problem for same-sex
parents by entitling birth certiﬁcates to full faith and credit recognition.
Regardless of whether a broad conception of recognition, adopted by the
Finstuen court, or a narrow conception of recognition—as contrasted with
enforcement—like that adopted by the Adar court, is used, the relevant
question in analyzing the feasibility of the birth certificate solution turns on
restrictions to the rights that flow from parental designation. The vast majority
of states provide that the birth certificate is prima facie evidence of the facts
that it contains,197 which would seem to solidify the parent–child relationship
as reflected in the birth certificate of the child of a same-sex couple.
The language of some of the current formulations of statutory policy
respecting the force and eﬀect of birth certiﬁcates seems to go even further.
For example, the New York provision provides that “a certiﬁcation of birth
. . . shall be prima facie evidence in all courts and places of the facts therein
stated.”198 Expansively phrased statutes that, by their terms, seem to reach
outside the borders of the jurisdiction for purposes of determining the
deference owed to the birth certiﬁcate support treating these documents as
full faith and credit records.199
Therefore, if a birth certificate lists both the biological mother and her
lesbian spouse as parents of their child, then the presumption of parentage as
reflected in the birth certificate is entitled to prima facie weight. That is, if the
relationship dissolves and custody is litigated, then the nonbiological partner,

197 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 338-41 (2018) (“Any certificate of Hawaiian birth . . . shall
be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.”); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/25(6) (“Any
certification or certified copy of a certificate in accordance with this Section shall be considered as
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated . . . .”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5016(b)(4) (2017) (“A
certified copy of a birth . . . certificate shall be prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.”).
198 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4103 (McKinney 2019) (emphasis added); see also CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 7-55 (2017) (“Any certiﬁcation of birth . . . shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated in all courts and places and in all actions, proceedings or applications, judicial, administrative
or otherwise, and such certiﬁcation of birth shall have the same force and eﬀect, wherever oﬀered, with
respect to the facts therein stated as an original certiﬁcate of birth.” (emphasis added)).
199 It should be noted that presently, even New York courts recognize that the prima facie
guarantee is likely not entitled to national recognition. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d
677, 685 (Surr. Ct. 2009) (“A birth certificate is, however, only prima facie evidence of parentage and
does not, in and of itself, confer parental rights that must be recognized elsewhere.” (citation omitted)).
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listed as a parent on the birth certificate, should have standing to petition the
court for parental rights.200 But because the birth certificate is entitled to prima
facie (as opposed to conclusive) weight, the facts it seeks to establish, including
parentage, are rebuttable. There are two actors who may seek to rebut the
presumption of parentage reflected in the birth certificate: the biological
mother (i.e., the petitioner’s former partner) and the biological father. Case law
indicates that the former scenario, where a same-sex relationship dissolves and
the biological mother uses the availability of rebuttal to contest the parentage of
the nonbiological parent, is more common than a biological father seeking to
challenge the nonbiological partner’s presumed status.201
Just as states have varying regimes on the marital presumption, state
policy also differs significantly on the extent to which rebuttal of the
presumption is permitted. Some jurisdictions, such as the District of
Columbia, recognize the possibility of instability for the parentage of samesex parents based on the potential for rebuttal and have narrowed the
circumstances in which parentage based on the marital presumption can be
rebutted. The D.C. scheme only allows for a challenge based on lack of
genetic connection in two circumstances: before the child’s second birthday,
which the court can reject under the best interests standard,202 or based on a
showing of clear and convincing evidence that the presumed parent did not
hold herself out as a parent of the child.203 Other states provide for a marital
presumption that is rebuttable if it serves the best interests of the child.204
This would seemingly provide a great degree of protection to same-sex
couples because if a child knows the nonbiological spouse as a second mother
and clearly accepts the parental status that she holds, the child’s best interests
200 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 48-1-232 (2018) (deﬁning a “legal parent” with standing as a
party to a custody action as “a parent, by law, on the basis of biological relationship, presumed
biological relationship, legal relationship, or other recognized grounds” (emphasis added)). A
nonbiological parent’s ability to establish standing in a custody matter is highly complex. For a
thorough discussion of these issues, see Kendra Huard Fershee, The Prima Facie Parent:
Implementing a Simple, Fair, and Eﬃcient Standing Test in Courts Considering Custody Disputes by
Unmarried Gay or Lesbian Parents, 48 FAM. L.Q. 435, 436 (2014).
201 See Q.M. v. B.C., 995 N.Y.S.2d 470 (Fam. Ct. 2014), where validation of the biological
father’s parent status necessarily negated any parentage claim that the biological mother’s marital
female partner (who otherwise would have been entitled to a presumption of parentage) might
make. Id. at 474. Q.M. is an outlier in this respect. Moreover, for couples who conceive through
artiﬁcial insemination, if the sperm donation is anonymous—which is predominantly the case—
there will be no possibility of a father later seeking to assert his parental rights. See Mary Kate
Kearney, Identifying Sperm and Egg Donors: Opening Pandora’s Box, 13 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 215, 225
(2011) (“Most sperm donors choose to be anonymous and contract for that anonymity . . . .”).
202 D.C. CODE §§ 16-909(b)(1), 16-2342(c)–(d) (2019).
203 D.C. CODE §16-909(b-2) (2019).
204 See generally Czajak v. Vavonese, 428 N.Y.S.2d 986, 986, 992 (Fam. Ct. 1980) (dismissing
a ﬁliation petition because the child was being adequately supported by the mother’s former
husband who, though not the biological father, raised the child as his own).
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are served by extending the marital presumption. Similarly, to the extent
that the focus of the child’s best interests is on his financial well-being, then
there will be little justification for rebutting the presumption if the
nonbiological parent helps to provide for the child.205 Finally, rebuttal of the
marital presumption may be barred where the challenger lacks standing, the
estoppel doctrine precludes the challenger from challenging the
presumption,206 a statute of limitations operates to bar rebuttal, or rebuttal is
contrary to the interests of the child.207
In conclusion, the practicality of solving the parentage problem for samesex couples with interstate recognition of birth certificates is not unduly
undermined by the recognition–enforcement distinction because this would
only become relevant where a third party seeks to rebut the parental status of
the nonbiological parent as reflected in the birth certificate, and the
circumstances in which rebuttal is appropriate are narrow.208
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has never taken up the issue of the level of
deference owed to an out-of-state record under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, and if it had, perhaps same-sex couples would enjoy greater
certainty regarding their parentage. However, on the strength of the Court’s
205 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Jones, 401 P.3d 492, 499 (Ariz. 2017) (noting that extending the
marital presumption to same-sex couples would “increase the likelihood that children born to oppositesex parents [have] financial support from two parents”). However, this consideration could also work in
the opposite direction to the detriment of same-sex parentage if the biological mother attempts to
enforce a support obligation against the biological father. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, Why a Craigslist
Sperm Donor Owes Child Support, VERDICT (Jan. 27, 2014), https://verdict.justia.com/2014/01/27/
craigslist-sperm-donor-owes-child-support [https://perma.cc/J5LK-B2VY] (describing how a child
support obligation was imposed on a “Craigslist sperm donor” who provided genetic material to a
same-sex couple pursuant to a contract between the biological mother, her lesbian partner, and the
donor that came into effect when the lesbian relationship broke up). However, the lack of cases
exemplifying this scenario, along with the predominance of anonymous sperm donation, indicates that
rebuttal based on this theory is relatively unlikely. See supra text accompanying note 201.
206 See, e.g., Barse v. Pasternak, No. HHBFA124030541S, 2015 WL 600973, at *14 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Jan. 16, 2015) (holding that a nonbiological mother was entitled to argue that the biological mother should be
equitably estopped from denying her parentage, where parentage was based on the marital presumption).
207 See Harris, supra note 8, at 73.
208 This possibility is not altogether unprecedented. For an example, see D.G. v. K.S., 133
A.3d 703 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2015), where a woman who served as a traditional surrogate for
a same-sex male couple later sought to establish a parental relationship with the child. Despite the
fact that the name of the nonbiological male partner was listed on the birth certiﬁcate, the court
refused to recognize his status, noting that absent biology or adoption, the birth certiﬁcate was
“not dispositive of legal parentage”. Id. at 726. As D.G. shows, the birth certiﬁcate solution is not
infallible, but it would provide a signiﬁcantly greater degree of protection to same-sex parentage.
Indeed, in D.G., ultimately all three parents—the surrogate, biological father, and his spouse—
were awarded equal custody of the child. Id. at 706.
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most recent family law jurisprudence—which mandates that same-sex
parents enjoy rights on par with opposite-sex parents and expresses a desire
to protect the emotional well-being of children of same-sex couples—the
birth certiﬁcate solution is eminently feasible and doctrinally supportable.
As Justice Jackson recognized, “The whole issue of faith and credit as
applied to the law of domestic relations is diﬃcult,”209 but the prospect of
refusal to recognize parental status of same-sex parents due to diﬀering
state policies places these families in a precarious position. Given the vital
importance of the interests that legal parentage protects, the possibility of
lack of recognition is highly disruptive to both the nonbiological parent and
her child. To mitigate against this uncertainty, the parental designation
reﬂected in the birth certiﬁcate should be entitled to interstate recognition.
For hypothetical Pam and Sue, this would mean that Sue, the nonbiological
parent, could use the D.C. birth certificate to register her child for school, or to
demonstrate her parentage in a later custody proceeding, or in the myriad
other instances where parental designation on the birth certificate is necessary.
Not only is the birth certificate solution doctrinally supportable under various
principles of the Supreme Court’s full faith and credit jurisprudence, as well as
its more recent pronouncements in the context of domestic relations laws, but
it is also easily implementable and could provide greater certainty to the
parentage of same-sex couples immediately. Given the importance of the
interests at stake, for the well-being of both the child and her parents, it is
imperative that states continue to adapt their family law regimes in ways that
protect today’s increasingly diverse family structures. Until legislative clarity
and predictability is provided across all fifty states, however, entitling birth
certificates to full faith and credit recognition would provide greater
immediate protection to same-sex parentage and ensure interstate recognition
of the validity of their family structure.

209 Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 (1945).

